



SELINUS UNIVERSITY
OF SCIENCES AND LITERATURE

**NEW POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN PAKISTAN BETWEEN
FUNDAMENTALISM AND MODERNITY
EMERGING MOVEMENTS BASED ON CULTURALLY OR
RELIGIOUSLY DEFINED CONCEPTIONS OF IDENTITY-
CASE OF RELIGIO-POLITICAL JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI**

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List of Abbreviations

NCIPM New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements

JI Jamaat-e-Islami

BJP Bahartia Jinta Party

MQM Muthida Muhajar Moment

PTI Paksitan Tehreek-e-Insaf

MMA Muthida Majlas Amal

IJT Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba

ABVP Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad

A Short Note on Translations and Transliterations

Many of the interviews which are used for analysis in this work were conducted by me in Urdu. The interview excerpts which are quoted in the text were translated by me into English.

Chapter 1

1. Introduction:

Religion movements has gained political power in a number of Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, including Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, India, and Pakistan. In this context, this study aims to explore how Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a political-religious party in Pakistan has emerged and evolved as a New Cultural Identity-based Political Movement (NCIPM) in Pakistan. The concept of New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) was developed by Professor Hartmut Elsenhans in the mid-1990s, in which he argues the decline of secular elites is due to recent political and economic conditions on the local and global level (Elsenhans, 2012).

Additionally, this study compares and contrasts the dynamics among the National Council of Independent Political Parties (NCIPP) and an Indian political party, the Bahartia Jinta Party (BJP). Elsenhans' NCIPM offers the theoretical construct in which to analyze political ideologies and agendas. A field study was conducted accordingly with regard to NCIPM. There is a perception that the JI is one of the most important representatives of the new movements known as New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements.

As a result of this study, we explore JI according to NCIPM and show how it has become a new political power on a local, regional, and global basis (Grare, 2001). This party presents itself as having a cultural and religious identity, so it is not rational to view it only from a political perspective. Since BJP also represents religious and cultural identity in India, the JI will be compared with the Bahartiya Janta Party (BJP), a political party that represents both identity and religion (Schwecke, S. 2011). Using examples of the popularity of JI in Pakistan and its comparison with that of BJP in India, the study will examine the socio-political conditions that have led to the emergence of the New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM).

2. Overview of Chapters

There are eight chapters total in the thesis, with the first chapter providing an overview and an introduction to it. The second chapter focuses on the theoretical background and its relevance to the empirical findings. Research methods employed by the author incorporated qualitative and quantitative approaches, including interviews with JI political leaders in Pakistan and content analysis of other texts. Moreover, Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the concepts as they relate to the development of modern JI politics. As outlined in Nasr's 1996 analysis of JI, this chapter discusses Maulana Maududi's ideology.

Having discussed the background of Muslim Nationalism and its origins and development, the fourth chapter considers the connection between Maududi's concept of nationalism. The fifth chapter examines JI's role after the creation of Pakistan and the circumstances that led to the formation of an Islamic republic after the political and ideological crisis experienced by Muslims. A theoretical framework, derived from the NCIPM, is used to analyze how the JI has developed since its foundation, as well as why it has emerged as a viable candidate for political power in Pakistan.

Chapter 6 analyzes the differences in the elements, characteristics, and movements of JI of the two groups. These are the variables that are analyzed. In Chapter No. 7, we examine whether and to what extent JI has been a productive force in Pakistan under the given circumstances, as BJP has been in India, and discuss the key factors that explain why JI has not played a distinctive role among the political parties. Finally, the last chapter will discuss the results and outcomes of this study and draw a conclusion based on the research questions.

3. Research Problem

In this analysis, the focus will be on the circumstances, which led to the emergence of the New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) and how Jamaat-e-Islami advanced their strategy by appealing to cultural and national identity values against the secular elite. To test the hypothesis that Jamaat-e-Islami is emerging as a NCIPM, I will use the same procedure as Sebastian

Schwecke used in his thesis "New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements" to test the Bahartiya Janta Party (BJP) as a NCIPM. Furthermore, the aim of this study is to compare Jamat-e-Islami with Bahartiya Janta Party. Additionally, the study will enlighten readers about the factors behind Jamat-i-Islami's failure to achieve political popularity in the general public and examine the reasons why the Bahriya Janta Party remained popular among constituency voters, and why it was in power for so long, but not the Jamat-i-Islami?

4. Method Used in the Thesis

As Dr. Sebastian Schwecke explains in his thesis "New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements" (Schwecke, 2011), this study will apply the method of measuring the variables to test the Bahatiya Janta Party (BJP). For the research conducted in this study, the researcher used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods.

This category of research consists of two parts. First, the researcher analyzes various materials related to the development of JI as NCIPM and the ideology of JI that is based on the philosophy of Maulana Maududi. Additionally, the researcher conducted a survey regarding the popularity and strength of JI in Pakistani society, which examined its role in the country as well as the general perception of the public toward JI and how successfully it implemented its policies. As part of the interview process, the tool used for interviewing has been attached to the appendix in which the opinion of people has been collected.

To obtain a more comprehensive understanding of JI's role as the NCIPM in Pakistani society, the researcher interviewed the members and political workers of JI. The interviews provide some insight into how the roles and circumstances of emerging political parties may change and vary

5. Sources

During the second stage, several studies were analyzed about the ideology of Maulana Mawdudi and JI, such as the ideology of Mawdudi and JI, as well as Pakistani society, development of democracy, the economic situation, and the study of the structure and function of Political Party (Mawdudi, 1996). In addition, research articles and newspapers were studied. In addition to the

2002 election, the results from 2008 and 2013 were also carefully examined. Gujranwala Constituency is the subject of this case study that was made to assess and investigate the development of JI as a NCIPM. As a result, a wide range of information from both officials and non-officials was gathered.

As part of the fourth stage of the research, a general study of the middle class, city classes, agricultural and industrial policies, education, and democracy was conducted to provide a picture of Pakistani society that is necessary for understanding JI as a NCIPM and its culture. A politician can use identity to build alliances across different social strata, because it partially transcends economic interests. Similar in some ways to broad-based forms of nationalism, cultural identity can be used to unite different social and economic classes into a common political object. Also, a general study about telecommunications, social relations, economic policies, and information networks was conducted. In addition, we looked at rental as this has a twofold effect - first, an intensification of competition over rent can engender greater radicality; second, it undermines the potential of the elite to secure its dominance, ultimately leading to greater accommodation and moderation among political movements.

6. Theoretical Framework

In the mid-1990s, Hartmut Elsenhans developed the theoretical framework for this study by arguing that changes in global and local political, economic, and social conditions have led to the decline of secular elites (Elsenhans, H., 2012). According to Elsenhans (2005), we are heading towards a world in which diverse cultural identities are negotiated by powers who defend their sovereignty but are not competitive with each other, as they are both taking part in maintaining what he calls the emerging multipolar system. In a reflection on the origin of social movements, Elsenhans thinks they have become networked movements and he describes them as such. Now, the leadership of these movements determines whether or not the people compromise for a middle-class orientation.

A comparative theoretical approach was used by Sebastian Schewecke to analyze this theory across Asia and Africa. With a focus on conceptions of cultural identity, he analyzes the rise and moderation of political movements in developing countries. In addition to the Hindu nationalist movement, he also includes several Islamist political movements into the same category, the New

Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) (Schwecke, S., 2011). Rent management is fundamentally the same challenge for old and new bureaucracies alike (Elsenhans, H., 2009).

6.1. Concept of NCIPM

According to Elsenhans, the NCIPM stands for the co-optation of segments of the population by political elites through rent distribution in a broader historical context, and is a political movement in developing countries with such polities. Cultural nationalisms (or other identities) of political movements exist as a result of these movements. In his report, he discusses how cultural identity is used to mobilize popular support for political movements across Asia and Africa, which he called 'new cultural identitarian political movements'. Various social groups giving their support to movements will determine whether the movements reach power or not. According to him, these new cultural movements arise in countries where state development policies have failed. Elsenhans is optimistic that these movements will serve to stabilize global politics despite the vast differences in their cultural motifs.

6.3 Political Islam

As such, Islamism and political Islam are used to illustrate Mawdudi's ideology of reinstating Islam through the establishment of an Islamic state. This specific focus confines the study to Pakistan and does not assume that Islamism or Mawdudi's influence is limited to the country. In addition, there is a distinction between militant Islam and institutional Islam. As opposed to the latter, the former prefers democratic means whenever possible. From an academic perspective, it will be very difficult to disentangle Jamaat-e-Islami's tacit connections, moral endorsements, and sympathies with militant groups in the Muslim world. The JI, however, has mostly engaged in its political struggle within the bounds of Pakistan through social, political, and electoral means.

6.4 Social Movement

A social movement may be defined as “deliberate patterns of contentious actions committed by groups whose members are working toward the same broadly defined goal” (Brannan, 2007). Brannan observes that "contentious actions" may arise when conventional methods of action such as voting, petitioning, or entering the political scene fail or are unavailable to an entire group of individuals.

The French scholar Frederic Grare explains Jamaat-e-Islami's evolution from a social movement to a pressure group to finally being a political party by applying social movement theory to it. According to him, when the Jamaat refused to recognize the system of government from 1941 through 1947, it was a social movement; when it worked with the government in order to accomplish its goals, it became a pressure group; and when in 1957 the Jamaat entered electoral politics, it became a political party. Grare (2001) argues that social movement theory can only be applied to the first seven years of its existence.

The reason why these movements are similar is that all of them want to be part of a system that destroys the prevailing system, so that the state can align with the concept of an Islamic government.

6.5 Globalization

In recent years, academic research on Islamic political movements has grown substantially, focusing mainly on their grand ideologies, organizational structures, electoral politics, and welfare networks and how they respond to the opportunities offered by globalization. Islamic movements are considered to be the key ideologue of the anti-Western ideational framework because of their perspective on globalization and cross-cultural interaction (Euben, 1999).

The 1980s also saw a wave of openness, deregulation, privatization and liberalization in several other Muslim countries, including Pakistan, paving the way for multiple economic and social forces to participate in the media, markets and politics and pursue a variety of objectives, ranging from economic profit to enhancing social and political influence.

In the early stages of privatization and deregulation, which began in the economy, wide ramifications affected other sectors of society and economy as well. In the initial phase of

privatization and deregulation, these changes were felt in various sectors of the economy, as well as the broader society as a whole. A large middle class has developed in Pakistan due to the inflow of resources from various sources (aid, wartime assistance, remittances, etc.) during the 80s, 90s, and after 9/11. Among Pakistan's current population, the middle class is estimated to be 35 percent (Nayab, D. 2011).

6.6 Democratization theory

Maududi means theo-democracy by which participation in general elections would lead to the establishment of Islamic rule, if there were no other possibility of gaining power. JI's core ideology weaves together theo-democracy, one of the Maududian's concepts.

6.7 Modernism

In the following period of Islamic modernism, apologetics was practiced. Though they were no doubt impressed with new Western ways, as they sought to define themselves, they were led to interpret their past through the prism of newly acquired values. During this important phase in the history of the intellectual thought of modern Islam, Sayyid Amir Ali (1928), the author of *The Spirit of Islam* (1891), was influential. His presentations of Islamic history, especially about the role of reason, were deeply influenced by the liberal thought of the late nineteenth century, making them understandable and appealing to a new generation of English-educated Muslims.

6.7 Secularism

Political parties are taking a stance on the basis of culturally declared identity in opposition to secularism. Politicians who study cultural identity are motivated by 'fundamentalism'. In spite of the socioeconomic agenda, fundamentalists are under the influence of the dissidence of secularism when it comes to the political system. A large part of Jamaat-e-Islami's focus on the state derives from a period when the state played an important role in global political imagination. Similarly, Jamaat-e-Islami's mobilization strategies have evolved as the notion of the state has changed over the last decades of the twentieth century. Pakistan, however, remains puzzled by both a lack of study and an overuse of this link with the global. Pakistani politics and Islamism in particular, on

one hand, are almost never analyzed without reference to an international political framework, while on the other hand, developments within Pakistan have not been analysed in depth through the context of such a global picture. Despite the lack of a direct correlation between cultural identity and rent or profit, the politicians can use it to win support in social classes of all kinds, including class-transcending social groups. A cultural national identity concept that transcends class is Secularism.

6.8 Moderation:

A major role was played by state and economic growth behind moderate economic growth by secular and nationalist parties. In a give-and-take system, the dominant political parties became ideologically flexible. Politics became a give-and-take game between dominant parties and ideologically flexible parties. On the political scene in Pakistan, Jamat-i-Islami has alternated between dictatorship and democracy.

6.8 Fundamentalism

In the current political context, Islamic fundamentalism is characterized as a political mobilization, revolutionary action, or legislation aimed at creating an Islamic state. The Pakistani government is located in an area where fundamentalism has, of late, been viewed as the main threat. Not only in Pakistan, but throughout the entire Muslim world, Islamic fundamentalism has risen as a political phenomenon. This international phenomenon is partly responsible for Islam's fundamentalism in Pakistan, and there are also specific local reasons.

While JI as NCIPM has been focused on gaining political power on local and national levels since it has been in the mainstream established political system, the religious-political party JI has gained considerable power on both levels. As an independent political party, Jamaa-e-Islami emerged from a base of religious and cultural affiliation.

The JI participated in the political and electoral processes of the country and advocated for the enactment of Islamic law. The study analyzes JI as a NCIPM from the perspective of Maududi's ideology because JI was founded not as a conventional party taking power or forming a

government, but as a distinctive revolutionary party. As a result of its appeal to society's general and educated circles, JI stressed the importance of changing the corrupt and secular system. Maududi's ideology emphasizes the Islamic identity and a new political structure that enhanced the party's membership.

Chapter 2: JI as the Emerging Power in the developing country

Using the concept of Prof. Elsenhans, this chapter will explore Jamaat-e-Islami through the lens of New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM). The variables will be used in this setting to determine this emerging phenomenon. Sabastian's analysis of the variables helps to explain how JI emerged and evolved. There are factors and elements that influence JI tendencies and formation in the variables.

In the world today, there are new political movements called New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPMs), which are characterized by culturally defined identities. Culture and tradition are embedded in these movements to gain support from the middle and lower middle classes. In many developing countries, these movements organized and strengthened their base of support, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the Bartiya Janta Party (BJP) in India, the Islamic Justice Party in Turkey and the Jamat-e-Islami in Pakistan. In addition to discussing various factors why these movements gain popular support and become significant political forces in countries that were previously under colonial rule, we will also discuss several reasons why these movements become popular. It is not simply that these movements emerge on the basis of economic reasons to replace the secular elite, but rather they do so on the basis of cultural values and religious identity.

Elsenhans (2012) states that these movements consider their culture to be different from others and give it a high value. The theoretical framework presented here is influenced by an interpretation of politics in many developing countries that incorporates a rent-based economic theory and the possible transition to capitalism of these societies (Elsenhans, 2009). In order to study the evolution of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, the Chapter shows how variables affect the evolution and development of NCIPM. As a result of cultural nationalism, these movements are in opposition to the old ruling secular elite. These movements thrive on the strength of the private sector, the expansion of the middle class seeking change, and the educated class weary of the status quo. Due to their appeal to the social and economic needs of the public, these elements facilitate the formation of cultural identities (Ibid.). Also, the middle class and educated class support the BJP and JI.

From its inception in 1941, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan stood out among contemporary Islamic movements by ensuring a democratic framework for its organisation; by having a written constitution to govern its operation; and by always operating within the confines of the country's constitution. As with any other political party in the West or East, its strategy for societal transformation is through appeals to intellect, community organizing, and rallying masses around its program. The fundamental vision of Islam is that Islam provides a universal and dynamic vision of life that is relevant to human welfare across time and space (Qazi, 2017).

This research will look into conditions, which led to the emergence of New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) with special focus on the popularity and emergence of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan and how JI advanced its strategy of appealing people to the cultural and Identitarian values against secular elite. The analysis will also focus on the party's political support base and its social roots in the current middle strata of Pakistani society. JI was formed out as an organization of religious minded academic scholars and professionals. Besides the religious scholars and the modern lawyers, they represent an ideological trend in a modern interpretation of Islam.

The purpose of this study is to examine conditions which led to the growth of the New Cultural Identitarian Political Movement (NCIPM). Particular attention will be given to the popularity and emergence of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan and how it pursued a strategy of appealing to culture and identity against the secular elite. In addition to analysing the party's political support base and its roots in Pakistan's middle class, the paper will explore the party's social and economic roots. Founded by religiously minded scholars and professionals, JI became an organization.

2.2. Discussion

Compared to lower classes, middle classes have comparatively higher education standards and have better access to information. Demographics are changing in Pakistan. The middle class has been growing steadily, and not just in absolute terms. In Punjab, especially central Punjab and the Potohar belt, the middle class has grown more rapidly than the country's population despite a lackluster economic climate. There are fewer skews in land ownership and a more educated and skilled workforce in both areas (Kardar 2014). NCIPMs emerge most often in conditions of rent

scarcity, but can also emerge in conditions of rent sufficiency, but in this case aren't likely to become political powerhouses. Another religiously based political party is Jameet-e-Ulma (F), and this party has always been in government and enjoying the benefits of high offices, but it could not become as successful as JI, because it was perceived as government ally paying rent and disregarding the middle and lower classes. The emergence of the NCIPM can therefore be attributed to rent scarcity.

It is actually cultural nationalists who challenge the secular classes or secular nationalists whenever secular nationalists fail to deliver. As can be seen from column 6, our situation in Pakistan is also affected by external actors. By using political parties of their choice and even through military regimes to further the interests of their own vested interests, external factors effect politics and even policies in the country. Due to JI's strict adherence to its ideology, and its tenacious ideas, these ideas are ingrained in society since they relate to Islamic teachings.

2.3. Emerging of JI

Mawdudi's ideology of Islamic revival is seen here as connected to political Islam and Islamism as a phenomenon. Accordingly, the study specifies this focus in the present context and does not assume Pakistan is the only place where Islamism is prevalent or where Mawdudi's influence exists. It is also important to distinguish between militant and institutional Islamism as described. The former opts primarily for democratic measures in contrast to the latter. The Jamaat-e-Islami's tacit and latent connections with a variety of militant organizations across the Muslim world, as well as its moral approval of and sympathies with them, may be difficult to disentangle. From a theoretical standpoint, it might be hard to distinguish Jamaat-e-Islami's tacit and latent connections, approval of and sympathies with various militant groups across the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the JI has mostly used social, political, and electoral means to contend in Pakistan.

Analyses of the support bases of these movements have shown substantial differences, especially in class terms, among various Hindu nationalist and Islamist movements, and the importance of middle class support for some of these movements. However, since these are most often from area studies oriented disciplines, studies which include a theoretical framework based on the

significance of political economy for the evolution of Islamist and Hindu nationalist parties remain rare. This is especially deplorable since political economy provides a link between the various movements which serves at least partially to transcend cultural and political contexts and thus facilitates comparison.

This is also important to describe that why JI is being compared to BJP on the basis of these variables. In fact, both parties, after the decolonization period, faced the same situation. For example, there was ruling secular elite focused on the industrialization and possessed all means of production but the other strata of society like old private sector, the poor and the emerging middle class struggled. The middle class was educated having education instead of having means of production and, therefore dependent on the state classes (Elsenhans,2012).

In the light of variables data through interviews has been collected. For each variable, relevant persons have been interviewed accordingly. For example , interviews of the relevant persons from bureaucracy , middle and lower class, leaders and members of specific political parties , especially Jamat-e-Islami have been conducted.

JI has very strong structural hierarchical pattern and hence is very organized in structure. JI selects its leaders democratically though fair election, the members of Jammat select Ameer (head of Party) on national level who is responsible for running the party then leaders at provincial levels in four provinces of the country are chosen accordingly . After this , among the members of the party are choosed the party activists at divisional level and such method is adopted at district , tehsil and union councils in a very organized manner. So keeping in the view of this pattern of the organization of JI, I have interviewed the leaders and members of the party according to this structural hierarchical set-up. From top to bottom, selected important and relevant persons at national, provincial, regional, divisional and local levels to get a broad perspective of the party system and objective.

In addition to the above-mentioned categories of Interviews, some other persons have also been interviewed who have different ideology from Jamat-e-Islami because it was necessary to give the other side of the picture to deepen the research and bring all facets of society for the better understanding of the hypothesis.

The record of the interviewed persons has been saved. Interviews have been divided in three different categories.ⁱ

Questionnaire parts relate to the following categoriesⁱⁱ

1) Jamat-e-Islami

This Questionnaire relates to New Cultural Identity Political Movement (NCIPM) proposed by Professor Dr. Elsenhans Harmut. According to this theory, mostly middle-class and lower class take part in NCIPM and besides, a few people from other segment of society also join it. The most prominent characteristic of NCIPM is that it refers to the cultural or religious aspect of an emerging movement rather than secular nationalism. Moreover, NCIPM also shows indefinite preference to the policies for the free-trade in contrast with the prevalent economic tendencies. Another specific characteristic of this concept is to take part in the established political system on national and international level.

In keeping view of this concept of NCIPM, the members and leadership of Jamaat-e-Islami is being questioned in keeping view of the theory of (NCIPM) by Professor Dr. Elsenhans Harmut.

2.4. Growing Middle Class and Pakistan Economy

This discussion, frequent and occasionally insightful, has rarely attempted to locate middle class activism in Pakistan as part of a broader trend of protest politics in the developing world. For the better part of the last decade, protests and political mobilizations against government corruption, perceived authoritarianism, nepotism, and even environmental degradation have emerged in Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, India, Venezuela and Pakistan. This rise of middle class dissatisfaction and its relative success in reshaping the vocabulary of mainstream politics poses two important questions: why has this dissatisfaction grown over the past decade, and how has it translated itself into a fairly successful political project? (Jodhka and Parakash, 2011).

The middle class in India has played a critical role in providing leadership to various sections of the Indian society. Middle classes were able to displace the traditional leadership, or the traditional leadership had to reinvent itself as middle class to stay in positions of influence (Ibid).

2.5. JI Movement within the NCIPM Theoretical Framework

A fundamental premise of the JI's political campaign has been that Islamic change in society can only be achieved when political power is transferred to a group of God-conscious, Islamic activists who will take over the state in order to establish the conditions for reform. According to the JI, the nature and direction of political power have changed, resulting in a reform of society. Both the ideology and organization of the JI were adversely affected by the transformation from a religious revivalist movement into a political party deeply involved in national politics. The JI had to compromise on several issues and sometimes revise its positions due to its active involvement in political life, like any other political party.

Over time, those views have changed, especially on such important issues as the Islamic character of the electoral process, the authority of the parliament to legislate on religious doctrines and practices, limitations on private property, and whether or not a woman should govern an Islamic state. Every time, the leaders of these institutions have used "reasons of politics" to support their ideological shift and to justify reinterpreting traditional Islamic doctrine. Despite retaining religion as the basis for its legitimacy, "political religion" is characterized by the fact that its religious content becomes increasingly instrumental.

2.6. Conclusion:

NCIPM is composed of members from the middle class and lower class, but they are supported by groups from the upper and lower classes. There have been instances in which NCIPM has emerged as a political alternative due to the limited ability of dominant secular political parties as anti-imperialist powers to provide reasonable rent through import substitution policies due to the domestic politics of rent distribution. NCIPM will participate in the political system as an effective political power in order to reduce rent, which stands a better chance if it is not produced from the sale of natural resources within the international market, but by indirect occupation. The NCIPM is likely to move towards moderation when surplus rent is present, either directly or indirectly through the economy. When the popularity of NCIPM declines, the desire for NCIPM to be owned permanently weakens.

JI has been analyzed as a NCIPM based on the theories of Prof. Elsenhans, and variables have been measured to discuss the emerging phenomenon. By analyzing the variables applied by Sabastian,

we gained insight into the reason for the emergence and evolution of JI. In the variables, factors and elements that affect JI tendencies and formation have been described.

The NCIPM is determined by the social power structure of social classes. In order for NCIPM to reduce rent, it is necessary to support liberal economic policies, which are in their interests. Lower middle-class citizens are prevented from participating in politics by rent reduction. State classes have total control over rent distribution. Moreover, the lower classes do not have access to this structure. In other words, the lower classes gain no benefits from joining this structure.

Chapter 3:

Development and Ideology of JI

3.1. Introduction

Maududi's vision of the Islamic state and its components are explored extensively in this chapter, which presents the basic postulates of his political theory and thought. Moreover, Maududi's views on western ideologies such as democracy, secularism, socialism, and capitalism must also be considered. This paper would also talk about his views on composite nationalism, and two nations theory. Towards the end of the chapter, he discusses his efforts in framing the Islamic constitution and in founding the Islamic party Jamaat-e-Islami. In Maududi's political theory, religion and politics are inextricably linked, and fulfilling religious dictates is impossible without establishing a political framework that follows the criteria established by the religion. As a result of this idea, some believe that we have a religious duty to struggle for an Islamic state in much the same way we pray.

It was decided to analyze Maududi's political theory on the grounds that his ideology is still adhered to by a large number of people around the globe. Among contemporary revivalist thinkers, Nasr cites Maududi as the most influential (Nasr, 2009). Maududi is one of the most influential revivalist thinkers of the present day, according to Nasr (Nasr, 2009). For the purpose of putting into effect his idea of establishing an Islamic state, he formed a political party called Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), one of the most organized political organizations in Pakistan (Ibid). Prior to the partition of the Indian Subcontinent, he organized this meeting in 1941. Until his death in 1979, Maududi oversaw the JI for more than three decades. Whatever Maududi wrote for the JI has become its standard discourse as a result of his contribution to forming its ideology.

One more reason to study Maududi's political theory is that debates about constitutionalism in Muslim majority countries frequently focus on the same issues he brought up in his writings. There are also differences in fundamental rights of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, as well as sovereignty of humans versus sovereignty of God (Joshi, 2003). It is Maududi's political philosophy that religion is inseparable from politics; therefore, the study of this link will lead to a better understanding of Jammata-e-Islami as a New Cultural Identitarian Political Movement in the light of Maulana Maududi's ideology. The country's religio-political conversation has been shaped

by Maududi's writings, with some blaming him for the acceptance of the Islamic political party concept (Ahmad, 2010).

According to legend, JI was the brainchild of Maududi and as such developed in line with his ideology and thinking. Therefore, this chapter will also analyze how JI developed and evolved in this context. The aim of this study is to investigate how the JI has changed its objectives and manifesto to adapt to the contemporary political and democratic system and if they are in line with the same ideological viewpoint or if they differ from the central purpose of the institution. Additionally, how JI has managed to ensconce itself in the current secularized political system will be discussed. In order to grasp the dynamics and politics of NCIPM, the ideology and evolution of JI must be understood in their entirety.

3.2. Maududi's Vision on Politics

According to Maududi, the people took Islam upon as only religion; rather Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a complete code of life, encompassing each and every walk of life (Kate, 1998). The concept of the Islamic "way of life" remains central to the JI's mandate and ideology, as does the commitment to establishing a political and social system governed by Sharia. JI lays emphasis on the establishment of society in lines with the Islamic socio-economic and cultural way of life, as it is described in the JI Constitution.ⁱⁱⁱ

Maududi's ideology is very close to the Egyptian Islamist Hassa al-Banna founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and al-Banna's successor, Sayyid Qutb because they share the same ideology to struggle for the dominance of religion and establish a true Islamic society .JI is particularly close to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Circumstances of Egypt and Pakistan may differ, but is ideologically close to the Muslim Brotherhood and is a transformational revolutionary party.^{iv}

Maududi's conception of the "sovereignty of God"^v was also central to his vision of the Islamic state. By this, he was referring to the primacy above all of God's divine will as revealed in the Qur'an and through his prophets. "No man," writes Maududi "has the right to order others in his own right to do or not to do certain things." (Maududi, 1960).

3.3. The Idea of Political state in view of Maududi

Political Islam and Islamic nationalism are employed here in the study for the purpose of understanding Maududi's ideology of Islamic revival through the establishment of an Islamic state. This study employs the concepts of political Islam and Islamism as phenomena inspired by Maududi's ideology of Islamic revival through the establishment of an Islamic state. By narrowing the focus to the given context, the study does not assume that Islamism's influence or prevalence is only limited to Pakistan. The difference between militant and institutional Islamism is also important. While democratic means are predominantly favored by the former group, democratic means are primarily favored by the latter.

I believe it will be very difficult to untangle Jamaat-e-Islami's tacit and latent links with various militant groups across the Muslim world, as well as its moral approval and sympathies toward them. However, the JI has predominantly used social, political, and electoral means to achieve its political objectives within Pakistan. In Maududi's view, the Islamic state would be universal and all-encompassing, extending into and shaping the lives of its citizens.

Maulana Nadwi, Maududi's comrade, however, rejected Maududi's ideology of political Islam, arguing that Maududi's assertion that God sent prophets to establish an Islamic state was a misinterpretation of the Islamic concept of prophethood. Maulana Nadwi argued that the primary task of prophets was to preach the worship of one God and to encourage others to carry out good deeds. Not every prophet was a ruler. Only a few were given that position. Maulana Nadwi thought Maududi had 'debasing' the 'lofty' Islamic understanding of worship by reducing it to merely 'training' people to become willing subjects of the Islamic state.

Maududi wrote that in his understanding of Islam, prayer and remembrance of God are treated as merely means to an end, establishing an Islamic state, whereas Maulana Nadwi felt the contrary is true. Islam is a religion where God is worshipped, not the other way around. He went on to say that if worship could be said to be a means, it is a means for securing God's 'will' and 'closeness to Him.' It can be defined as the assignment of political overtones to Islam, where Islam is seen not only as a religion but as a political ideology with distinct political goals, such as the establishment of an Islamic state.

Consequently, Islamism is the ideologyization of Islam in the context of presenting Islam as a totality based on its socioeconomic, political, moral, and spiritual goals, along with Islamic justifications for its specific political modes of thinking and action. Hence, Islamists rarely distinguish between an ideological worldview and the fundamental tenets of religion when they urge adherence to Islam in its totality. In fact, they view Islam as an ideology rather than a religion.

3.4 JI Between Modernity and Fundamentalism

Researchers have used 'fundamentalism' as an analytical category (Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), 1995). Now, coining and using a loaded term like 'fundamentalism' within a Muslim context is highly contested and unaccepted by many. Academics are aware that "fundamentalism" is not confined to Islam, but is apparent in most religions and appears to be a worldwide reaction to the peculiar strains of late twentieth-century life (Armstrong, 1995). In their use of fundamentalism as an analytical category, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis assert that it generally possesses three characteristics: (1) it is a political project that rejects pluralism in favor of returning to the holy texts; (2) it is a movement that combines faith and politics for political gain; and (3) it is a movement designed to control women.

Thus, I would argue that the theoretical debate between Sahgal, Yuval Davis, and Sayyid reproduces the problematic binary of essentialists and anti-essentialists in their representation of Islam(ism). The authors make generalizations and stereotypes about religious ideologies, but Sayyid, on the other hand, avoids discussing certain problems of gender inequality within Islamic discourse, like unequal rights in property, unequal political rights, and the right to use contraception to control reproduction (2003, 153). For the purposes of exploring how Islam can be used for political protest and mobilization, I agree with Sayyid that conceptually, the term 'Islamism' is preferable as the term 'Islamic fundamentalism' is problematic and the term 'political Islam' is a bit vague.

Islamism is the act of giving political overtones to Islam, where Islam is seen not simply as a religion but as an ideology, encompassing distinct political concepts aiming to establish an Islamic state. The religion of Islam is, therefore, for the Islamists both a political ideology and a guide to programmatic political action. Thus, Islamism is the ideologyization and totalization of Islam while giving it Islamic justifications for its specific modes of political thinking and action in the form of elaborating it as a 'holistic way of life' with socioeconomic, political, moral, and spiritual goals.

3.5. Political Strategy in Islam

Maududi's political ideas draw from a variety of sources; they include ideas from Enb Teimie, Mohammad Bin Abdolvahab, and Salafi. As a result, he sought to purify and modify the religion. Shah Valiallah Dehlavi and Akhvan Alsafa, on the other hand, influence his thought process. The similarities between Maududi and Seyed Jamad Edin Asadabadi are undeniable despite his philosophic similarities with Seyed Ahmad Khan.

He avoids being solely dependent on “Ijtihad” Jurisprudence and enriches his thoughts by literate and logical reasoning. Maududi actually opposes complete reliance on Ijtihad, appreciates modern science and distinguishes between modernism and Westernization. He believed that modernization minus Westernization is possible and accused those who opposed modern science of stupidity. He names the Holy Quran, Prophet’s tradition, Kholafa Rashidin’s behavior, and the rules and verdicts by great jurists as references for inferring rules.

Political Theory of Islam corroborates the basic argument of Jihad in Islam. The object of the Islamic state is to implement the will of Allah for the whole of humanity as revealed in the Quran. Allah is the only legitimate sovereign. The caliph has only delegated administrative power derived from the whole umma. “The entire Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the practice of His Prophet”. Maududi calls such a state a “theo-democracy.” (Maududi,1976).

As Freeden (2000) describes it, political ideology in this study refers to 'complex combinations and clusters of political concepts', as well as to a wide-ranging structural arrangement that attributes decontested meanings to a range of mutually defining political concepts (Freeden, 2003). A particular ideology would try to define a definitive meaning to a particular concept that is fundamental to its subscribers, since ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts. Depending on the ideology, justice might mean this, equality might entail this, or such a society might be ideal.

3.6. Maududi's Point of View on Islamic Democracy

The idea of an Indian Muslim nation-state was initially opposed by Maududi. Saigol eschewed nationalism in favor of pan-Islamism and advocated protecting Indian Muslims within an Indian state (Saigol 2009:5). Maududi rationalized the new state as an Islamic and not a national state when its creation was inevitable due to political momentum (ibid:5). Having developed the concept of an "Islamic state" based on his theology and postcolonial nationalism, he was the first Muslim ideologue to do so (Bashir 2009:5). Maududi's ideas were foremost centered on the creation of the Caliphate and an Islamic panna-national state governed by Sharia. Government would be governed by elected officials, but they would have to follow God's will and Islamic law. The state would be based on three principles: tawhid (monotheism), risala (prophethood), and khilafa (caliphate).

In addition, he coined and popularized the term "Islamic revolution" in the 1940s. Maududi also laid out a stage-by-stage strategy for Islamic revolution in his many speeches and writings. His first major book, *Al-Jihad fil-Islam* (Jihad in Islam), defined the various ways and means of struggle for the perfect Islamic state. In other books, Maududi described the social, economic and political principles of Islam.

"Islam is not a 'religion' in the sense this term is commonly understood. It is a system encompassing all fields of living. Islam means politics, economics, legisla-tion, science, humanism, health, psychology and sociol-ogy. It is a system which makes no discrimination on the basis of race, color, language or other external categories. Its appeal is to all mankind. It wants to reach the heart of every human being."

3.7. Critical appreciation of Maududi's Ideology

Maulana Maududi says the universe is not comprised of independent entities, but rather, it is an integrated system whose parts are all connected to each other. Earth particles are linked to Mars and Mercury particles as closely as the hair on my head is linked to the goose on my hand." In another place, it says, "The great law, in which everything from huge planets to tiny particles of earth is bound, was made by a very great ruler." Birth, life, and death are all under Allah's law". Maududi does not introduce Islam with the concept that this is my religion and belief rather he introduces it with the concept that this is the religion of the whole universe, so he considers human life by considering it as a unified whole.

3.8. The status of Pakistan: Secular or Islamic

Secular states are religiously neutral and allow minorities and various sects within Islam to practice their religion freely. Additionally, by delinking the religious code from the legal code, laws would begin reflecting contemporary realities. We should at least consider this idea as it deserves serious consideration.

Pakistan is not Turkey, and even Turkey had only transformed after the defeat of the first world war that thoroughly discredited the Caliphate. Due to Ata Turk's presence and unique circumstances, Turkey emerged as a secular republic. Our armed forces are completely opposed to secularism, whereas theirs are almost indoctrinated with it. A 'soft revolution' won't happen in Pakistan.

Pakistan's constitution-making process lasted until 1973. Most religious scholars had supported the nationalist movement of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, which helped establish Pakistan. There is a stumbling block in the discourse about Pakistan's origins, namely the two-fold legacy that was based first on the belief that Muslim culture and economy could not be preserved and developed in a Hindu-dominated post-colonial India. In the discourse on how Pakistan came into existence, the stumbling block is the two-fold legacy that was based, first, on the belief that Muslim culture and economic development would not be possible in Hindu-dominated post-colonial India (Two-Nations-Theory) and, secondly, on a semi-religious philosophy that, pioneered by Muhammad Iqbal and Jinnah, offered the ground for what Aziz calls a national belief. (Aziz, 2009).

According to this argumentation, the Hindu majority in the Indian National Congress refused to collaborate with the leadership of Tehrik-e-Pakistan (Pakistan Movement/ Freedom Movement) who gained constitutional guaranties for the Muslim minority in a united India. The decision for partition and the creation of Pakistan was therefore an act of 'self-defense' against the various attempts to create a Hindu hegemony in India (Sadiq,1969).

Generally, religious parties fulfill those legal conditions that apply to secular political parties and are in terms of analysis structurally not distinct from political parties. Therefore, they participate in the civic culture and have to accommodate their program with the principles of legitimacy – especially the religious component of a state's ideology - to which they frequently refer.

Some renowned scholars have criticized Maulan's ideology such as Hussain haqqani^{vi} discusses about the role of JI in his book. Although the functionaries of the Pakistani state remained largely secular until the 1980s, the state helped create a Pakistani sense of self as the citadel of Islam, which in turn enabled Islamists greater freedom of organization and movement than in other countries.

In its claim to engage in an open, constitutional struggle for an Islamic government replicating Rashidun's caliphate, Jamaat-e-Islami has not always lived up to its claim. The Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the PPP received money from the ISI for its campaign in 1990, which had been influenced by the agency to prevent the PPP from winning. Former ISI officials have confirmed the charge, but Jamaat-e-Islami has denied it. Former ISI officials have confirmed the charge, but Jamaat-e-Islami has denied it. The Jamaat-e-Islami did not benefit significantly from covert funding.

In recent years, Jamaat-e-Islami has aligned itself with other religious and political parties to secure a share in power in the northwest Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. It has taken a staunchly anti-American stance even though it was one of the major conduits of CIA funding for the Afghan Mujahideen during the 1980s. The group's strategy seems to be to increase its influence within Pakistani society by aligning with hyper-nationalists.

In the first chapter of the book which deals with 'the identity and ideology of Pakistan', Haqqani writes that 'the first formal step towards transforming Pakistan into an Islamic ideological state was taken in March 1949 when the country's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan Review Article 161 presented the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly. 'After the Objectives Resolution, there was no turning back from Pakistan's status as an Islamic ideological state.' 'Pakistan was now the bastion of Islam and an Islamic state, even if the pious elite did not yet rule it,' he writes. Explaining the circumstances and reasons which provided an opportunity to the Islamists to become more vocal and powerful, Haqqani writes that the religious frenzy began to grow when the 'theologians who had not supported the demand for Pakistan, started calling for the new country's Islamization.'

The only time, the JI contested elections entirely on its own was in 1993 when it could only manage three seats in the house of 207 members. Before that, it was part of the alliance with the Muslim

League in 1988 and 1990 general elections. The JI in 1997 boycotted elections. The party was for an across-the-board accountability before the polling.

Again in 2002, the JI was part of the MMA, a conglomerate of religious political parties, which won a healthy number of 59 seats in the National Assembly, and 52 seats in the house of 124-member of the then NWFP assembly and formed a government there.

Khan asserts that historically no such comprehensive revolutionary movement was launched to highlight deen as a system. Islam is characterized by its spiritual aspect, but this aspect has been overshadowed by the political dimension of Maududi's deen. Khan asserts that it is wrong to assume that this imbalance is a result of involvement in the political process by the JI, rather it is the natural consequence of overemphasis on politics in Maududi's ideology. According to Khan, the problem of the politicization of Islam by Maududi has to do with his theory and is not an outcome of his political struggle.

3.9.-Political Religious Theory

In different strands of political Islam, jawed outlines the reasons for the necessity of an Islamic state and government. Secondly, "conception of the moral role and power of government" provides reasons for striving for an Islamic state, which is particularly associated with revivalists. Secondly, some goals cannot be achieved without a state, such as the implementation of the Shariah code in its entirety. Traditional ulama hold this view and revivalists extend it as well.

According to Maududi, this purpose is the establishment of *hukumat-i-illahiya* and he has coined terminologies to distinguish his conception from other forms of government. The most important of these terminologies are "sovereignty of God" in contradistinction to "popular sovereignty" and "theo-democracy" in contradistinction to "theocracy" on the one hand and "secular Western democracy" on the other. He opines that all problems in different systems of the world are due to the fact that human beings rule human beings and if popular sovereignty is replaced with the sovereignty of God, these problems are bound to be resolved.

Maududi regards his notion of Islamic state as "universal and all-embracing" in a sense that it would extend into and mould the personal affairs of its citizens. He distinguishes this interventional

aspect of the Islamic state from other totalitarian states and emphasizes that “individual liberty is not suppressed under it nor is there any trace of dictatorship in it.

3.10. The Movement of JI

To understand this fact, we have to clarify the reasons of its creation and the theories on which its foundations were laid and what its objectives are in current scenario. Furthermore, what advancement is expected in future? JI is considered a political party in the new era of Pakistan that is stick to its distinct Islamic principles, and represents itself as a political as a political identity based on the Islamic culture. At the earlier stage, some of the members were of the view that, first of all, political awareness should be given to the Muslims of the united India so that they might serve the society according to the religious commandments because, according to them, religious problems can only be addressed within the orbit of the religious teachings and values. In fact, the prominent leaders of the party did not have any idea to hold the political power and they thought that there was no need for the establishment of the Pakistan at this moment, because first it was necessary to change the society in the Islamic color.

3.11 New Emerging Party of JI

Maulana Muadudi, in the contemporary era, is considered intellectual of high class and his sagacity and prudence also entail the mundane matters along with the religious ones. However, people liked the ideology of such great scholar but did not side with him practically in the political issues and what are the reasons for this and why they could not draw practical support

Since Congress party was secular and consisted of Hindus as well as the Muslims, but the main authority was in the hands of the Hindus. Muslim League was founded in 1906 and it represented only the Muslims and therefore, the Muslim did not consider it a secular party. The Muslims of India wanted the enforcement of the Islamic system but the purpose of the establishment of the Muslim League was only to protect the rights of the Muslims and not to implement the Islamic system, therefore, most of the people call it also as a secular party and secondly, Maulana Maududi was of the view that the people at the helm of the affairs of the party were surely Muslims but they were neither practical Muslims in the true sense nor religious scholars or philosopher and for that reason he thought them secular.

3.12-Change of JI

Maulana Maududi wanted to establish the Islamic system rather than secular one, in other words, the purpose of JI was to mould the society in the color of the Islamic Law and to promote Islamic culture. Therefore, it may be called a political party with new cultural identity and this concept was propounded by Dr. Prof. Elsenhans Hartmut in NCIPM theories.

JI is an emerging political power with cultural identity characteristically based on the fundamentals of Islam like Zakat (Islamic economic system), contrary to the both socialism and capitalism. Secondly, JI takes Islam as complete system based on the practicable and implementable principles. Maulana put forth his stance in this way, "The gate of Ijtihad (effort for personal decision through analogical reasoning) is always open in Islam" Thirdly, Maulana does not separate politics with religion rather he considers Islam as a complete philosophy of life. The same idea was also expressed by the great poet and philosopher Dr. Allama Iqbal^{vii}. Fourthly, Maulana opposed Muslim nationalism and he always thought above this idea of Muslim Nationalism.^{viii}

Since JI emphasizes upon the need of Ijtehad to establish the Islamic cultural identity, therefore, it also can be called an emerging movement with cultural identity. There is another important point about the JI is that it accepts and favors modern scientific progress and advancement as "Phenomenon of Nature", but it opposes the process of globalization because JI thinks it as a danger to the Islamic culture. For this reason, some critics exclude JI from the Modern Movement. On the one hand, JI is adhering to the conventional fundamentals and on the other hand it introduces itself as modern and progressive party, therefore; this is worth researching deeply.

3.13 Conclusion

Drawing on the preceding discussion we can conclude that what is being construed as divine in the political theory of Maududi may involve some divinity, but is substantially informed by the interpreter's socio-political context and his subjectivities which cannot be regarded as 'the divine'.

Establishing an Islamic state has been and will continue to be a significant issue within the framework of Islamic constitutionalism. Maududi is one of the most vocal and articulate ideologues of the 20th century who has written extensively about the nature and responsibility of establishing an Islamic state by Muslims. Maududi's main theses in this regard are inseparability of religion

and politics and indivisibility of God's sovereignty which are assumed to be grounded in the divine. The ideology of Maududi emphasized on the Islamic cultural identity and new political set-up that increased the membership of the party.

In fact, Maududi emphatically focused on the need of implementation of Islam rather than preaching in all walks of life and according to him this is obligatory on each and every Muslim to take part in this struggle. So, he wanted to form such party which would implement his comprehensive ideology as he said.

“It is in my mind to diffuse the influence of Western thought and civilization from the minds of the Muslim because the Muslims have their own distinctive code of life and separate identity, own culture and civilization, education and economic system”.

Maududi believes in a state based on ideal Khilafat and moral values. He argues that Islamic utopia is not achievable by any state, unless it is based on rule of God. His prescription of the state is divine theocracy; where the representative of the public, who also is a competent Muslim, is granted the power. Maududi believes in election, although, not as a conclusive solution. He struggles to find agreement between free election and competent leader. Although he recognizes the majority vote, his quest to propose a comprehensive model is fruitless.

Speaking of political traditions, under the influence of the environment he lived in, he revives the idea of returning to the past. Probably, his ties with the past lead him to bring the idea of ideal Khilafa. He proposes a sort of public and parliamentary democracy; a type of state which is not practical. The merit of his idea probably lies with the fact that he does not limit idiotism and idolatry to states but rather accuses Islamic society and cultural tradition of Muslim. He also relies, smartly, on moral trainings of societies; the problem for which Maududi places Islamic societies and pagans societies in the same group as they act similarly regardless of their religions nature. In conclusion, it is worthy to mention another point; the anti-western dominance tradition. Maududi finds criticizing the West civilization and culture an age long mission; while he uses the same political model and method for religious society reformation, which has been successfully practiced in the West to control and criticize the power; A tradition, which has followed by other Islamic thinkers.

Chapter 4 Nationalism and JI

4.1 Introduction

Muslims have always contested the concept of nationalism. In this chapter, we examine Maududi's concept of nationalism within the context of Jamaat-e-Islami's ideology. The concept of Muslim Nationalism in Pakistan today, especially as it relates to Jamaat-e-Islami, how is it organized? Does Islamic Nationalism also apply to Jamaat-e-Islami as a NCIPM in Pakistan, and what effect does Islamic/ Muslim Nationalism have on JI? Furthermore, as far as Muslim nationalism is concerned, what is JI's position now as they opposed it during the creation of Pakistan? Has the JI's concept of nationalism evolved since Maududi's time? We will also examine Hindu nationalism within the context of BJP's political role in India and whether Hindu Nationalism played a pivotal role in BJP's success as NCIPM in India compared to Jamaat-e-Islami's success as NCIPM in Pakistan.

4.2 Concept of Nationalism.

As defined by Adam and Kuper (1985), nationalism is the belief that each nation has both the right and the duty to constitute itself as a state. For the past several hundred years, nationalism has been regarded as one of the oldest and most powerful ideologies in the world. Nationalism has several definitions, some of which overlap. Prof. Anthony Smith defines nationalism as simply 'an ideological movement for achieving and preserving autonomy, unity, and identity for a population which some of its members consider an actual or potential nation. Traditionally, nationalism is defined as having three main components: autonomy, national unity, and national identity. The author also asserts that it is a contemporary phenomenon.

To expand his base of support, Jinnah appealed to conservative religious leaders with assurances that Pakistani law would be based on the Shari'ah, or Islamic jurisprudence. This undermined his efforts to establish the secular sovereign state he envisioned because many Muslims recognize the sovereignty of God as supreme over national sovereignty. Another characteristic of nationalism is that nations tell citizens how they can demonstrate their patriotism. For Pakistan, nationalism and its attendant sense of patriotism rest with a small minority that sets out to impose its concept of a nation-state on everyone else.

Initially, the elite of the Punjabi and Mohajir minorities who called for an Islamic state of Pakistan desired an Islamic nation as long as control of Pakistan was not given over to theologians. A third

characteristic of nationalism is the attempt to bring together a nation under a single ideology. It is difficult, if not impossible, to unite all of Pakistan's ethnic nationalities under one Islamic ideology. For example, Sunnis and Shi'a have different doctrinal beliefs. The rallying cry of an Islamic nation worked initially but only for a short time. The seeds of the nation were firmly planted in the decades prior to 1947 with attempts to establish links among the different groups, religious and political. This was met with very limited success. Later, this rallying cry would work against Pakistan. In the 1990s, there was a great deal of tension and ethnic clashes between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims, making Pakistan politically instable for most of the 1990s.

4.3 The concept of Muslim Nationalism in India before partition

The Muslim nationalism was the result of this devolution that reminded Muslims of their distinct identity they had and that differed them from rest of the nations in Hindustan. Muslim Nationalism in Sub- continent is a term much more talked in context of Renaissance Muslims witnessed due to effort of poets, philosophers, politicians and common Muslims in aftermath of 1857 war of Independence. The atrocities of the English and aloofness and hostility of Hindus was the reason behind. This feeling of nationalism was at its apex at the time of creation of Pakistan.

4.4 Nationalism in the eyes of Maududi

Nationalism, which emerged and spread in the West with such characteristics, also penetrated the Muslim ummah and shattered its unity and integrity. Muslim scholars in the Arab world, Turkey, and the Indian sub- continent had mixed responses to the ideology of nationalism, ranging broadly from rejectionism to accommodationism. In the Indian subcontinent, such scholars as Husain Ahmad Madani and Abul Kalam Azad responded to the theory of nationalism and its derivative terms nation and nation-state with an accommodative approach. Other scholars, however, such as Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi, challenged the theory from an Islamic perspective and rejected all of its basic principles and secular foundation.

During Freedom struggle of India, the most significant political problem was of 'Nationalism'. During the days of freedom struggle the terms 'Nation', 'Nationality' and 'Nationalism' were abundantly used but there was hardly any clarity about its meaning. The Congress leadership believed that all people living in India would constitute one Nation and the people belong to different religious minorities would constitute sects but their rights would be guaranteed. To

promote Indian Nationalism the Indian National Congress launched two schemes. One was the educational scheme called the Wardha scheme and the Vidya Mandir scheme the second called 'Muslim mass contact movement'. The aim of Congress was to unite all Indians irrespective of their cast, creed, region and religion, in order to achieve Puran Swaraj or Complete Independence from the British Crown.

He was of the view that neither composite nationalism nor Muslim nationalism is Islamic in their orientation, therefore, he warned the Muslims of the sub-continent to be beware of both. Though he was not fully into politics but as a Muslim intellectual, he proposed for the Muslims of the sub-continent the Islamic concept. We, therefore, need to examine Mawdudi's views on Nationalism, Composite Nationalism, Muslim Nationalism and the Two Nations Theory. During Freedom struggle of India, the most significant political problem was of 'Nationalism'. During the days of freedom struggle the terms 'Nation', 'Nationality' and 'Nationalism' were abundantly used but there was hardly any clarity about its meaning. The Congress leadership believed that all people living in India would constitute one Nation and the people belong to different religious minorities would constitute sects but their rights would be guaranteed.

Maududi strongly opposed the concept of nationalism, believing it to be against the spirit of monotheism and "a Western concept which divided the Muslim world and thus prolonged the supremacy of Western imperialist powers". After Pakistan was formed, Maududi and the JI forbade Pakistanis to take an oath of allegiance to the state until it became Islamic, arguing that a Muslim could in clear conscience render allegiance only to God.

Maududi argues that nationalism relied on the right of sovereignty and that political power must come from the nations' will. It was an option to save the nations from the control of tyrant political power of the Middle Age. What was new in nationalism is replacement of clergies by people as the rulers, which gradually cut the hands of Church from the power and apposed presence of religion in social fields. He finds nationalism as a new form of idiotism with man at its center who accepts social and individual codes in absence of God.

The power is granted to human and people appear as legislators. The basis of laws, regulations, decisions, measures, plans, and social/individual interactions are people desires and wills. In addition, political strategies are set based on human and nation's interests. Still, Maududi opposes distinguishing between national and nationalism with nationality. He rejects nationalism as love of

motherland and intentional zeal regarding nation and pure race or loyalty to the society. He believes that nationality is a natural matter, which accompanies man from birth to death.

Maududi believes that the systems which are being made for the Muslims are mostly based on secularism that is dangerous for the Muslims because the real problem is the revival of Islam and not the revival of a nation. Maududi believes that only concept of Nationalism without Islam cannot solve the real problem of the Muslims, therefore; he proposes the concept of “Muslim Umma” United Muslim world or Islamic global world. In such an Islamic global state, an exemplary civilized and political system, providing the equal rights and opportunities, regardless of any racial or national biases, will be established.

Maududi strongly opposed the concept of Nationalism for the Muslims because he believed it is a tool in the hands of imperialist Western powers to create a rift in the Muslim world and prolonged the dominance of the of the imperialistic forces for their vested interests and sinister designs . Therefore, he turned down the concept of separate Pakistan on the basis of nationalism dividing the Muslims of the United India, arguing that a Muslim could in clear conscience render allegiance only to God.

In this context, the opinions of other prominent scholars will also be discussed. Many distinctive scholars of United India have thoroughly discussed the idea of nationalism, some were against the ideology of Maududi and other favored him in his idea of Muslim Nationalism. The some following International and regional scholars are some examples.

Muhammad Asad in his book “The Principles of State and Government in Islam” argues that although the Muslims are for the most part imbued with enthusiasm for the idea of a truly Islamic state - that is, a state based not on the concepts of nationality and race but solely on the ideology of the Qur'an and Sunnah, they have as yet not realized a concrete vision of this form of government embodying a distinctly Islamic character. The very fact that none of the existing Muslim countries has so far achieved a form of government that could be termed genuinely Islamic, makes a discussion of the principle which ought to underlie the constitution of Islamic state imperative. By surveying nearly fourteen hundred years-beginning with the "Hijra," the formal origin of the Islamic calendar-this book demonstrates how manifold forms of the Islamic state may emerge from Islamic foundations, and how, essentially, any state that emerges, to be truly Islamic, must incorporate the doctrine of government by consent and counsel. He believes that the freedom and

prosperity of Muslims would not be achieved unless its adherents whole-heartedly adhere to its tenets and strive for their implementation.

4.6 Concept of Pan Islamism

Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, author of *Challenges to religions and Islam*, observed that „Maududi“s religio-political vision was shaped by the social decline and political frustrations that the Muslims of India had been suffering since 1857. These had become more pronounced after the Khilafat movement collapsed in 1924. In fact, his ideas were in part the result of the failure of the Khilafat movement to unite India“s Muslims“.

Maudoodi opposed both the all-India nationalism of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim nationalism of the Muslim League. Eschewing nationalism entirely, he urged India’s Muslims to recognize Islam as their sole identity and to become better Muslims. His views during this period (1930-1933) are published in the three volumes of *Muslims and the Present-Day Political Struggle*.

In his book ‘Issue of Nationalism’ Maududi writes: “The utmost perspective of Islam is a global world, by breaking the chains of racial and national prejudices, in which whole mankind has equal rights, equal opportunities of development and is a shareholder in political and cultural system.”

Naeem Siddiqui in his book 'Al-Maududi' writes that Maududi is the first person of this era who literally broke the combination of Islam and Muslim nationalism, who claimed Islam a welfare religion for all mankind not an ethnic sect and religion, who had a very high and broad perspective of a global state and one humanitarian community and who practically declared the Muslim nation the scope of work but he moved forward by breaking the confined boundaries of Muslim nationalism in the first step. This is Maududi's excellence.

According to Wilfred Contwell Smith, Maududi`s Islamic System is derived from Islamic history from whose flow he abstract for his state pattern. It also owes something, however, to modern concepts and potentialities.

Maududi believed that every nation based on religion should have complete autonomy. According to him, Islamic nationalism was different from Muslim nationalism. Maududi opposed the

nationalist Ulama organized in the Jamiatul Ulama-i-Hind because he believed in territorial nationalism.

4.7 BJP and Hindu Nationalism

Hindu nationalism is a movement of right-wing nationalism and social conservatism combined with a Hindu political identity so strong that its ultimate effect has been described as, if not Hindu supremacy, then Hindu hegemony to the potential detriment of the 20 percent of Indians who are not Hindu. That often means Muslims.

It is argued here that these movements can be subsumed under a single category, irrespective of the cultural content of their respective ideologies and the various political contexts they are operating in, as New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) – following Elsenhans’ attempt to classify certain Islamist and the major strands of the Hindu nationalist movement in the mid-1990s (Elsenhans 1994). Before proceeding to discuss the concept of NCIPM (and its applicability in the case of the BJP) it is necessary to trace the ambiguities that arise from the approximation of these movements with fundamentalism.

Hindu nationalism is a political ideology that encompasses different groups. Broadly, these groups all define Indian culture and politics in terms of Hindu religious values. The Sangh Parivar, or “family of organizations” is a loose grouping of Hindu nationalists, which has its roots in the 19th century confrontation between colonial Europeans and Indians yearning for a national identity.

Hindu nationalism developed as a way to form a specifically Indian national identity which stood against both the British colonizers and the Islamic dynasty that preceded it. This was articulated by Vinayak Savarkar – an atheist – who wrote a pamphlet in 1928 called “Hinduta: Who is a Hindu?” in which he said that a Hindu was someone who regards India as both a fatherland and a holy land. In the 1920s, the movement gained traction among poorer Hindus (the lower caste) who felt oppressed by the ruling Hindu elite and for whom the idea of returning India to its “pure Hindu roots”. In an interview before the election, Modi said that “Hinduism is not a religion, but a way of life”.

BJP was formed in 1980 with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) as its ideological mentor it still considers RSS as that. The RSS is seen as a Hindu nationalist organisation by most of those outside it and is portrayed as such in the mainstream media as well, and the RSS does not deny

that. However there is a nuance that gets lost in the din that is our media. The RSS while maintaining that it is Hindu nationalist claims that Hindu is not a religious identity.

4.8 BJP and Hindu Nationalism

The BJP has in its political practice throughout the years demonstrated that its version of Hindu nationalism often clashes with generally acknowledged features of Indian democracy, especially minority rights. This chapter also analyses the ideology of the BJP relating it to a general theoretical discourse on nationalism and also to the contemporary debate on citizenship within political theory.

The BJP was formed in 1980, in a merger of several pre-existing Hindu nationalist parties. It is widely seen as the political wing of the RSS. It grew in strength, soon becoming the second large national party, an opposition to the dominant Congress Party. From 1998 to 2004, the BJP formed the national government, leading the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). It was the first non-Congress government to last a full term in office. Generally described as right-wing and Hindu nationalist, the BJP advocates social conservatism, self-reliance, and foreign policy centered on nationalism. The party expresses its commitment to Hindutva, asserting that this is simply cultural nationalism that favors Indian heritage over westernization, which therefore applies to all Indians. However, analysts point out that in practice, the BJP tends to define India in terms of its Hindu heritage and culture, to the exclusion of other religions.

In 1980s, the political climate in India changed largely as a consequence of an increased usage of ethnic and religious identities in party politics. A number of issues relating to the conflict between majority and minority rights featured in the political debate, and due to the changes in the political climate, it was now possible to more forcefully mobilize around a Hindu identity.

In 1985 a Supreme Court verdict strengthening the rights of divorced Muslim women to maintenance from their former husbands opened up a debate on the position of the Muslim minority. The case originated in a petition filed by the Muslim lady Begum Shah Bano in 1978. She had after 43 years of marriage, and the birth of five children, been divorced by her husband in 1975. In her appeal, Begum Shah Bano claimed her right to maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judicial magistrate court of Indore ruled in favour of the appellant as did the high court of Madhya Pradesh.

The theoretical debate on Indian nationalism is to some extent a critique of the discourse which developed in Europe and North America. One example is Partha Chatterjee's *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* in which he argues that the current terms in use are inadequate for an understanding of Indian nationalism and that the dichotomy of western versus non-western forms of nationalism needs to be modified.

4.9 JI and Contemporary idea of Nationalism

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan is distinct among contemporary Islamic movements in that it had strong democratic traditions right from its inception in 1941; has a written constitution to govern its organization; and has always operated within the framework of the country's constitution. It seeks to bring about societal transformation through appealing to the intellect, organizing communities, and rallying masses around its program—just like any other political party in the East or West. It believes that Islam provides a universal and dynamic vision of life that is valid and relevant for human welfare in all times and places.

Jamaat-e-Islami tried to justify the first Muslim ideologue to fully articulate the notion of an "Islamic state," which emerged as a synthesis of his theology and postcolonial nationalism. The Jamaat had its emergence in the period prior to the partition of the Indian sub-continent when contesting visions of nationhood emerged. Amongst Muslim theorists of the sub-continent, Jamaat leader Maududi represented a third strand that denounced both the composite nationalism framework of Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind and Muslim nationalism of the Muslim League. He held that the idea of territorial nationalism was antithetical to the ideal Islamic state. However when it became clear that India was going to be partitioned and Pakistan created, Maududi changed his mind and embraced the idea of a Pakistani state which he had criticised so fiercely. He moved to Pakistan in 1947 and worked to turn it into an Islamic state. Jamaat-e-Islami has been successful in the establishment of an Islamic nation. The 1951 provincial elections brought JI into Pakistan's mainstream political discourse. The JI went on to emerge as a major political party in Pakistan. JI has now turned the notion of nationhood into the Islamic Nation or Islamic state and this is the centre of its politics.

4.10 Muslim Nationalism as relevant term for JI as NCIPM.

Though the JI's politics is based on the notion of Islamic state and has been successful in winning over a large number of people, but this support could not be turned into electoral success. JI could not gain power in the parliament based on the notion of Islamic nation or Islamic state because there are other several factors and elements involved in the electoral process. One of the major pivotal factors is the interaction of JI with the domestic and foreign actors including the army, elected representatives, and other political parties – have had ample occasion to co-opt, counter, or coerce Jamaat-e-Islami and its agenda.

The 1973 constitution enlisted the main principles of State Policy. Maximum efforts were made to improve the character of this constitution. Like other constitutions, the 1973 constitution of Pakistan also provides for the protection, propagation and enforcement of Islamic Ideology.

Despite the best intentions of its founders, Pakistan was driven from its inception by ethnic politics. Following Partition, the new state “suffered from ethnic mobilization and politics of provincialism”. Jamaat-e-Islami has found itself unable to address ethnic concerns. This failure stems from their pan-Islamist ideology and its antipathy toward ethnic identities and interests. Jamaat has found itself moving away from opposition and towards the defence of the status quo on the matter of the unity of the state.

Jamaat-e-Islami continues to ignore this pervasive ethnic politics. It has avoided addressing ethnic concerns and maintains a national message. Though a focus on national versus regional or local issues is a common theme among Pakistan's Islamist parties, Jamaat's broader orientation has “closed it to the mass of [Pakistan's] electorate, who identify closely with ethnic politics and the demand for socioeconomic justice”.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan declared independence on August 14th, 1947. Founded as the independent nation-state of British India's Muslims, Pakistan is today 96.4% Muslim. One would expect that an Islamist party would do well in Pakistan. However, this has not been the experience of Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami, the oldest and arguably best-organized political party in Pakistan.

4.11 Conclusion

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that Maududi, at the early stage of movement for the Independent Pakistan, opposed the Muslim Nationalism and two-nation theory in the United India because he was of the view that it will be fatal to the unity of the Muslims and the strength of the Muslims will be divided. However, after the creation of Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami has articulated this ideological stance into a new way that is not a nation state but an Islamic state; a changed outlook, and showed the flexibility in the rigid ideological stance. The ideological stance of Pan-Islamism is now a cliché in the prevailing politics of Pakistan and JI cannot appeal to the massive support on this slogan. With the repeated failures in the general elections, Jamaat-e-Islami has realized that the Message is out of step with the ever-changing dynamics of Electorate.

Nationalism is as much an issue of identity as it is a political movement. Nationalism, one of the most vibrant political dynamics of the 19th century, can be organized into various categories such as liberal, civic, ethnic or cultural, as the definition of nationalism varies. Although civilization has always had a tendency to organize itself around a shared identity, nationalism is generally identified as a modern movement.

While BJP's politics and electoral success is mainly dependent on the Hindu Nationalism because there is huge Muslim minority in India. The roots of Hindu Nationalism in the lower and middle lower class are ingrained and BJP derives its major support from these classes. BJP has raised the slogan of Hindu Nationalism successfully by creating the fear factor of the Muslims in India and touching the collective memory of the nation about the separation of Pakistan from the United India.

Moreover, there are no such big foreign and external actors in the politics of India. Army has always kept away from the politics as compared to Pakistan. There are agricultural and economic reforms on massive level that disconcerted the resources from few hands to the lower and middle classes.

In the given political circumstances, JI has emerged as NCIPM and is a mainstream political party based on the cultural and Islamic identity; however, it is struggling in the Electorate. JI needs to formulate the strategy to cope with the major hurdles of ethnic politics and non-political actors.

Cognizant of the current political dynamics and cultural scenario, Jamaat-e-Islami employs keywords such as “feudal,” “class,” “masses,” and “liberation” – “words usually associated with

left leaning intellectuals”. It remains to be seen whether this more populist tact will reverse the Jamaat’s electoral fortunes.

Maududi was initially opposed to the idea of a separate nation-state for Indian Muslims. He eschewed nationalism in favor of pan-Islamism, and sought protections for India’s Muslims within an Indian state (Saigol 2009: 5). When political momentum made the new state inevitable, Maududi rationalized it as an Islamic and not national state.

Chapter 5: Electoral Politics of JI

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of Jamat-e-Islami after the creation of Pakistan as the emerging power in a developing country like Pakistan, as well as its role as NCIPM. Specifically, election data of JI will be presented and results regarding the success and failure of JI in the elections will be examined. Researching secondary sources that discuss and evaluate the electoral politics in Pakistan led to the collection of the data. Analyzing the data leading to the stated conclusions about JI's electoral strategies is accomplished through the use of content analysis.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) started as a social movement in 1941 and became an influential group to support Islamic constitution in Pakistan. Later, the leaders of this movement decided to take part in electoral politics. Moreover, in 1957, the movement evolved into a political Party. The JI started as a platform for Maududi's ideas. However, later conflicts developed on the objectives and vision of the party. JI as a political party had to make certain compromises that did not go in parallel with its ideology. This chapter will also shortly discuss that why the JI, unlike political party of India BJP (The Bharatiya Janata Party), has failed to convert its popularity into electoral success and has failed to mobilize the masses for collective action for any sustained period of time under an Islamic banner.

The chapter aims to address this relatively surprising outcome. It argues that Jamaat-e-Islami's electoral failure in Pakistan can be attributed to the co-optation of its political platform by the state and other actors; its inability to address the politically salient dimensions of ethnic identity in Pakistan; and its elitist ideological disposition.

5.2. Evolution of JI Political Role in Pakistan

Jamat-e-Islami is an Islamic political party as well as revivalist movement based on the thoughts of Maududi. JI has articulated clearly political version of Islam. The party has been struggling for the restructuring of society and politics as well as the establishment of a state that would represent the spirit of Islamic law: replacing the secular state with an Islamic one. The JI is perhaps the first movement of its kind to develop systematically an Islamic ideology, a modern revolutionary reading of Islam, and an agenda for social action to materialize its vision. JI political philosophy

revolved around the concept of Theo-democracy means to form government through democratic process, governing according to Islamic teachings.

Islamist parties or independent candidates associated with such parties compete or have competed (from 1990 onwards) for votes in a number of Muslim countries. As the strength of Islamist parties varies considerably. While the Islamic party of Azerbaijan is recorded for no seats in the parliament, Turkey, Jordan and Bangladesh are three success stories.

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan is distinct among contemporary Islamic movements in that it had strong democratic traditions right from its inception in 1941; has a written constitution to govern its organization; and has always operated within the framework of the country's constitution. It seeks to bring about societal transformation is through appealing to the intellect, organizing communities, and rallying masses around its program—just like any other political party in the East or West. It believes that Islam provides a universal and dynamic vision of life that is valid and relevant for human welfare in all times and places.

Table 1: Election Result of National and Provincial Assemblies of JI 1988

	Punjab	KPK	Sind	Baluchistan	Total
Seats	14	4	8	0	26
Seats won	5	2	0	0	7
Special women's seats	1	0	0	0	1
Total seats	6	2	0	0	8
Total votes received	620.952	88.840	100.520	0	810.312
Average votes per candidate	44.354	22.210	12.565	0	31.165

Source: (Nasr, 1994)

The JI had won eight seats of the national Assembly out of twenty six and thirteen seats of provincial Assembly out of forty four, which were given by IJI. The JI had won 26.9 and 25 percent

seats of the national and provincial seats it contested respectively. It received 810,312 and 459,165 votes for National and provincial Assembly respectively. MQM won all seats from Karachi, which seriously damage the JI strong base. Initially, IJI got limited success in 1988 election and was able to continue political pressure on Pakistan people party government. They were defending the populist slogan of Islamization in open platform, on other side, by this way have created difficulties for the current leftist government.

1990 elections were conducted in very polarized atmosphere. Pakistan people party and former prime minister was under pressure due the cases that were filled against her government. On other side, IJI was the major element of the caretaker government and close ally of Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In election of 1990, an alliance of eight political parties Islamic Democratic Alliance and people democratic alliance of four other parties were the major competitors. Pakistan Muslim League, JI and National people's party along with smaller parties were included in IJI. On other side, Pakistan people party and Tehrik-e Istiqlal were prominent key players in People's Democratic Alliance (PDA).

Table 2: Provincial und National Assembly Election 1990 JI Source: (Nasr, 1994)

	Punjab	KPK	Sind	Baluchistan	Total
Seats	14	4	8	0	26
Seats won	5	2	0	0	7
Special women's seats	1	0	0	0	1
Total seats	6	2	0	0	8
Total votes received	620.952	88.840	100.520	0	810.312
Average votes per candidate	44.354	22.210	12.565	0	31.165

The JI had won eight seats of the national Assembly out of eighteen and twenty seats of provincial Assembly out of thirty seven, which were given by IJI. The JI had received 03 percent in the election to the national and 2.6 in the election to the provincial Assembly respectively. However,

JI continued its performance as real opponent of non-Islamic rulers, while seizing power-sharing chances. The JI boycotted the 1997 election, the party leadership was for an across the accountability before the election. JI leadership argued, that article 62 and 63 of the constitution to be implemented, which call for person of honest moral character only be allowed to contest election. Because Pakistan electoral political have been dominated by disqualified politicians.

Then JI took part in 2002 elections in alliance with MMA (Muthida Majlas-e-Amal) under the Military dictator General Pervez Mussaraf. On 10 September 2002, MMA released their manifesto for the election it proclaimed, to implement Islamic system in Pakistan based on Quran and Sunnah, to protect ideological and geographical boundaries of the Islamic republic of Pakistan, to eliminate linguistic, ethnic and regional hatred and establish a peaceful society based on Muslim brother hood, to promote democratic values and protect Constitution of Pakistan, to have autonomous judiciary and the supremacy of the rule of law, eradicate corruption, provincial autonomy, protection of minorities, remove feudalism, provide rights to women in accordance with Quran and Sunnah, ensure freedom of press and freedom, effort for economic progress.

Table 3: Elections Results in 2002

ELECTIONS results in 2002			
Political Group	Votes	%	Total
Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid-i-Azam (PML/Q)	7 613 411	25,7	77
Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP)	7 632 708	25,8	63
Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA)	3 349 436	11,3	45
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)	2 790 747	9,4	14
National Democractic Alliance (NA)	1 363 814	4,6	13

Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM)	918 555	3,1	13
Pakistan Muslim League (Functional)	328 137	1,1	4
Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)	212 749	0,7	2
Pakistan People's Party (Sherpao)	98 638	0,3	2
Pakistan Muslim League (Zia-ul-Huq)	87 394	0,3	1
Independents	n.a.	n.a.	29
Others	n.a.	n.a.	9

Source: (Khan J. , 2014, p. 302)

It was only in the general elections of 2002 that the alliance of religious parties ended up with a considerable number of seats in the parliament. The percentage of total votes cast for the religious parties increased from less than 2% to almost 11% winning those 46 seats in the national assembly. The religious alliance for the first time in Pakistan's history formed a majority government in the province of North-West Frontier. The increased support for the religious parties was linked to the religious alliance's anti-American slogans that had been used to exploit people's emotions after American forces had entered the bordering territory of Afghanistan. However, as the most recent elections of 2008 have shown, the Pakistani public has taken back the mandate from the religious alliance and elected a semi-secular party, Awami National Party (ANP), to form a government in North-West Frontier replacing the religious alliance. The religious alliance once again ended with a dismally low of 2% of total votes cast.

Analysts had the opinion that MMA success was engineered by the military ruler to made his importance to Washington, but general Musharraf rejected the notion and was of the opinion that if had to rig the election, then would have done for its party. The rising of MMA was unwelcome phenomenon to US in the context of war in terror. Musharraf tried his best to settle the deal with MMA for the formation of government in Centre, but the deal did not finalize because of conditions put by MMA, Musharraf step-down as Army Chief and the reversal of pro-US policy.

In 1990s, JI was facing the two powerful political parties and leaders. Nawaz Sharif the leader of Pakistan Muslim League and Benazir Bhutto the leader of Pakistan People Party. Soon after 1990 election JI left the alliance of IJI. In 1993 election, the party went for election with new experience with name of Pakistan Islamic Front. But they were failed to defeat the two powerful parties of that time. Qazi understood the ground reality of Pakistan politics. Whatever the religious parties contesting separate election, they could not compete the secular forces. Due to division of Islamists vote the other political parties would take advantage.

Finally, Qazi Hussain Ahmad succeeded in his plane in 2002 election. MMA become the 2nd largest party of the parliament. Since 1987, JI for the first time secured five seats in Karachi. The party recovered its old strong to some extent. During Qazi's era, JI boycotted the 1997 and 2008 general elections. In 1997 general election, the party leadership demanded the implantation of 62 and 63 articles of the constitution. By this way they wanted to keep away corrupt" elements from entering parliament. The Party had boycotted the 2008 elections that were held under General Musharraf, however earlier as part of the MMA the Jamaat-e-Islami had been part of the government in Balochistan and Sindh, while it had formed the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP).

Jamaat-e-Islami contested the May 2013 election with the scales of justice as its election symbol and with calls for re-establishing a state similar to the one led by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina. Its slogan, "Change of System is the hope of the nation," was remarkably similar to that of Khan's PTI. Jamaat-e-Islami's manifesto claimed that it would end "US slavery to restore Pakistan's independence and sovereignty, and promised self-reliance against western-led globalization. Jamaat-e-Islami's tie-up with Khan has enabled it to translate its organizational capability into serious political influence, without actually having to win votes.

Khan's PTI and Jamaat-e-Islami formed a coalition government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa after the elections, enabling the Jamaat-e-Islami to put its "United Front" strategy into practice in government.

Table 4: Elections 2013 Results

Selected 2013 National Assembly Election Results				
Party/Coalition	Votes won	Percentage of total vote	Seats secured	Percentage of seats secured
PPP (Pakistan People's Party)			41	
PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz)			185	
PML-Q (Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid-e-Azam)			2	
PTI			35	
MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement)			23	
ANP (Awami National Party)			1	
JI			4	
Other parties			9	
Total			300	

Source: EU Election Observation Mission, Pakistan 2013 Final Report General Elections – 11 May 2013 Page 72 ANNEX 2 – NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS ECP, as of 13 June 2013

To conclude this, from 1988 to 2013, the JI started formulating its policies which were against injustices in the society. The policy of JI mainly recruited people from the new urbanized lower classes which dominated the party. This policy shifted the support of JI from urban middle class to lower middle. By using and capturing this shifting opportunity structure, JI was able to transform the traditional Islamic politics into more modern social justice-based Islamic politics. After the failure of Pakistan Islamic front, the alliance of MMA was huge victory for JI. In political history JI got maximum seats in the parliament. There were many reasons of the MMA success, first was the anti-America feeling among the people, particularly among the Pashtun belt of NWFP and Baluchistan due to US attack on Afghanistan. The second reason was the Anti-Islam and pro-US policy of Musharraf regime, which anti-Musharraf vote polled for MMA. Third was the decision of the military regime of keeping away Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from the politics. Fourth reason was corrupt leadership of the major political parties, who disappointed the common people.

The alliance of MMA was successful experiment for religious parties including JI. In electoral history, first time JI won numbers of seats along other religious parties. The great electoral victory of MMA was also contributed by above factors, but important factor was the unification of religious parties in one platform.

5.3 Failure of JI in Elections

As a pressure group, JI had done well in having the government responds to their concerns and demands but because of its hard-line approach, JI as a political party failed to gain popularity at a national level. One of the off-shoot groups of JI became involved in militancy and sectarianism. Kumar (2001) states “These organizations which divided the Islamic political forces, fuelled extremism and sectarian violence, and further alienated the people from religious politics.”

While some of JI’s own policies resulted in its failures, there were factors beyond the party’s control that also contributed towards its poor performance in the elections. The JI started off as a platform for Maududi’s ideas. However, later conflicts developed on the objectives and vision of the party. JI as a political party had to make certain compromises that did not go in parallel with its ideology. For example, in 1965, JI was supporting Fatima Jinnah for her presidential campaign against Ayub Khan even though it was against Maududi’s views on the social role of women (Nasr ,1996). Moreover, by siding with General Zia after the fall of Bhutto’s regime, JI showed its willingness to work with authoritarian regimes to achieve its objectives. This created an unfriendly relationship between the JI and other political parties.

With very rigid membership criteria, the JI limited its scope of becoming a party of the masses. It could only field limited number of candidates due to the increasing requirements of closeness to religion by the members (Moten,2003).

Above all, the media has played its vital role in the electoral process in Pakistan because the people are not so educated and well political aware and media manipulates the facts and figures of the performances of the favored political parties which give them more advertisements. JI’s media campaigning has been so poor or intentionally they do not pay heed to the image building through media. As the below-given Chart about the coverage of election campaign in election 2013, it is obviously notable that JI got less coverage than other major political parties in the countries and the parties who got most coverage, won the most seats in the election. It denotes clearly that media has played a partial role in the elections and this is also the one of the major reasons of the failure

of JI in the electoral process in spite of the fact that is the most-organized party at grass-root level and popular in the middle class.

Total time allocated to political actors during prime time programming (without political advertisement)

	ATV	PTVnews	ARY TV	GEO News	Dawn News	Express News
Others	12%	8%	5%	4%	3%	2%
Independent candidates	2%	1%	3%	2%	2%	1%
JUI F	3%	3%	2%	3%	1%	1%
JI	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%	2%
ANP	5%	3%	9%	7%	10%	6%
MQM	5%	4%	17%	13%	22%	16%
PML-Q	3%	5%	3%	2%	1%	3%
APML	12%	7%	8%	7%	12%	12%
Caretaker government	6%	14%	4%	2%	2%	3%
PML-N	24%	21%	17%	19%	16%	27%
PTI	17%	17%	19%	32%	16%	16%

Another obvious reason lies in the very rigid membership criteria, the JI limited its scope of becoming a party of the masses. It could only field limited number of candidates due to the increasing requirements of closeness to religion by the members (Moten, 2003, 403). Another missing feature in the speeches of Maududi and JI’s strategy was a viable economic plan (Nasr, 1996, 50). The JI leaders were active in criticizing socialism but did not have a sound economic plan of their own except resorting to Islamic teachings about creating a just society. Nasr (1996) writes Maududi “worried less about economic liberation than about preserving dress, language, customs for they were essential to safeguarding Muslim culture”. These vague and abstract principles did not seem to attract people who ended up voting for other mass parties. The JI has not only failed to achieve its objective but also moved away from it while trying to make compromises to achieve political success.

Another issue is a lack of real focus on winning elections as an objective. Jamaat's organization has a heavy ideological and social agenda that consumes considerable human and financial resources. Other political parties make elections their sole focus. One solution currently on the table is the creation of an independent political wing, although under the same central emir. It appears this debate surfaced more strongly after the 2018 general elections.

Before then, Jamaat's leadership will likely have to make some kind of decision on the issue. When this decision is made, it would allow room for the now- marginalized but more capable cadre of affiliates to get involved in the party. These people prefer to stay on the margins because of Jamaat's regimental structure and rigorous organizational activities, which they find difficult to keep up with.

The centre of JI's endeavor was and has been the enforcement of Islamic System in the country, under the teaching of the Quran and Sunnah. The JI, however, has no significant record in electoral achievements.

Its limited exposure to the West allows it to use modern idioms from philosophy, social sciences and humanities to explain religious thesis. In this way, it is striving for a kind of neo-fundamentalism. Its opponents blame it for promoting centralization of power for a fascist system in Pakistan. JI is a party whose influence in the country's politics, even beyond, is superimposed on its lack of electoral success. Over the years, it has been a front-runner in the effort to create a constituency for the establishment of an Islamic state.

The JI is not designed to be a populist party; it was formed as the vanguard of the Islamic revolution. The party leadership should have known this for long now. They have tried to revive their electoral fortunes through populist slogans before and failed. This strategy will not help them displace mainstream populist parties like PML-N and PTI in future either. Nothing short of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan can bring it out of irrelevance. And if that ever happens, the Jamaat will not be leading it"(Nasir Jamal. 2014).

The Jamaat political discourse also reveals an abstract conceptualization of issues based on moral ideals and worldviews that enables it to escape concrete solutions of specific issues. For an ideological/revolutionary movement, in Gramscian analysis, "the discourse of political Islam seeks to unify individuals on the level of ideas and a common world perception, not necessarily by

economic status or on the basis of material deprivation”(Butko, 2004). Islamists mention the “totality of human predicament” and the “totality of systemic failure” as the gross basis of miseries and problems. Whereas, such gross generalizations could be helpful in understanding the overall gravity of human miseries in Pakistan.

The essentialist theoretical approaches assume Islamic movements, if got access to state power, will lead their respective societies to a kind of totalitarian state, a condition resulting into complete destruction of the existing social, political and cultural traditions and replacing them with new political institutions.

5.4 Concept of JI on Ethnic Politics

Despite the best intentions of its founders, Pakistan was riven from its inception by ethnic politics. Following Partition, the new state “suffered from ethnic mobilization and politics of provincialism” (Adeney, 2009). Jamaat-e-Islami has found itself unable to address ethnic concerns. This failure stems from their pan-Islamist ideology and its antipathy toward ethnic identities and interests. Jamaat has found itself moving away from opposition and towards the defence of the *status quo* on the matter of the unity of the state (Nasr,1995).

Such was the case in 1971 in the matter of Bengali secession. The Jamaat “turned a blind eye” to the socioeconomic concerns of East Pakistanis and joined Yahya Khan’s military regime in rhetorically and physically suppressing the secessionists (Ibid,p.283). As noted previously, Pakistan’s ruling elites have traditionally been able to count on the Islamist parties for support against ethnic nationalist challenges to the state (Khan,2006).

Nevertheless, ethnic identities continue to be one of the most salient features of Pakistani politics. Since the 1971 secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan has seen “[Baloch]insurgencies... Pashtun separatism... Sindhi regionalism... and Muhajir mobilizationalong ethnic lines” (Adeney, 2009). The birth of ethnic parties like the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) that focus on advancing the interests of a particular ethnicity also lead to a decrease in support for religious parties(Kumar, 2001, 273).The JI’s electoral misfortunes should tell us that the dream of establishing a shariah state is, if not impossible, unnecessary and unwelcome in Pakistan. The politicization of Islam and Islamization of politics will only lead to the abuse of religion for political purposes and vice versa.

5.5. JI’s changing Stance From Religious Party to Politics

Jamaat-e-Islami has since its inception been an elitist movement of educated, middle-class Muslims in British India and Pakistan. Its platform is not in accord with the views of Pakistani voters, as evidenced by its historical lack of electoral success. Daanish Mustafa argues that, on Islamic doctrinal issues, Maududi's views were colored by his "subjectivity as a Muslim bourgeois in colonial India" (Mustafa 2005: 336). In British India, Maududi clearly distinguished his movement's politics from the populism of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League (ibid: 336).

Maududi's opposition to the creation of Pakistan, coupled with his ideological disdain for mass politics, explain his original intent in the creation of Jamaat-e-Islami. Jamaat was originally intended to be a da'wa ("proselytizing") organization that would act as a pressure group outside the realm of democratic politics (Moten 2003:393). It viewed its mission as one of "religious propagation and of moral and spiritual Jamaat-e-Islami training and character building." Jamaat's main activity between 1941 and 1947 was publishing (ibid: 394). Jamaat-e-Islami's objective was not to win the hearts and minds of the electorate through their rhetoric, but to "[infiltrate] the structures of power, in order to impose its concept of an Islamic order from above" (Mustafa, 2005).

Jamaat-e-Islami created this "organizational machine" through adherence to a rigid party structure with "clear lines of authority and a hierarchal structure, as well as a nationwide network of departments and locally-organized branches" (Siddiqui 2010: 1).

At the bottom of this hierarchy were hamdard ("sympathizers"), followed by mutaffiq ("affiliates"), and arkan ("members") at the penultimate level. Jamaat is headed by an emir ("leader"), who consults a governing shura ("counsel"). Maududi always intended for Jamaat to remain a small cadre of educated, ideologically pure elites. He argued that the majority of Pakistanis were not sufficiently knowledgeable about Islam to actively engage in bringing about the Islamic state. He went so far as to say that "only 5 percent of the Muslim population of Pakistan were enlightened about Islam, 90 percent were illiterate with blind faith and the remaining percent had been corrupted by Westernization" (Ibid:396). Unwilling to engage in mass politics, Jamaat-e-Islami gained influence largely through its student and professional organizations, extensive international publishing activities, and links to officials within the state.

The most important goal of the Jamaat became the replacement of the “leadership of the wayward with those of the men of sterling character and piety” (Murad 1980, 267). An example is when it lost the 1970 election. Knowing that the people’s mandate did not give first priority, they had to settle with only a few clauses in the 1973 constitution, (Pakistan’s current constitution) which were Islamic. These were no more than a re-framing of the Objectives Resolution of 1949. If it had remained outside the electoral process, as seen in 1949, it would have been a more potent force to be recognized with.

While its ideological impact has been fairly broad, Jamaat has thus far had limited success in parliamentary elections. Jamaat’s distinctive organizational structure is frequently cited as a reason for its limited electoral victories. Some analysts noted that our organizational structure is more suitable for a revolutionary struggle, and not necessarily parliamentary elections. This is despite the fact that Jamaat is considered the most internally democratic party in Pakistan, one that particularly obsessed with winning elections as much as they are keen on participating in them.

A report published by a think tank, the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), testifies to this fact.^{ix} At times, one feels a lethargic contentedness among some of Jamaat’s leaders and members, despite its poor electoral performance. They are not is an objective in its own right, and elections provide an occasion for this. This approach has been the subject of debate within Jamaat for quite some time now.

Another issue is a lack of real focus on winning elections as an objective. Jamaat’s organization has a heavy ideological and social agenda that consumes considerable human and financial resources. Other political parties make elections their sole focus. One solution currently on the table is the creation of an independent political wing, although under the same central emir. It appears this debate will surface more strongly after the 2018 general elections. Before then, Jamaat’s leadership will likely have to make some kind of decision on the issue.

5.6 JI and Modernization

The theory looks at the internal factors of a country while assuming that with assistance, "traditional" countries can be brought to development in the same manner more developed countries have been. Modernization theory was a dominant paradigm in the social sciences in the

1950s and 1960s, and then went into a deep eclipse. It made a comeback after 1991 but remains a controversial model (Knobl, 2003).

The term of modernity has always been a crucial and mostly misunderstood concept of the 20th century. There is another significant misunderstanding about the “clash” of religion and modernity. The last misunderstanding is the usage of Islam as an anti-modern term and lifestyle in the lives of Islamic societies (Butterworth, 1992).

Secularization is not a necessary condition for development and modernization. It is one thing to reject the power of any religious group or “class”, but quite another to also reject what the revealed religions have to offer. Looking from the other side of the medallion, Islam is not against modernity and development. Islamic societies have been static and have not developed in the manner they should, this is essentially due to the failure in understanding and application of the Qur’anic doctrine in its totality.

As long as scientific and technological progress is the basis of modernization, the process of modernization is unstoppable. The challenge which faces the JI is how to develop the capacity to handle the continuous social and political changes accompanying modernization. In fact, there is need to define the role of religion in modern society .The assumption that Islamism as a rejection of modernity is false.

The most serious problem in the Muslim society has been that a synthetic exposition of the Qur’an has not taken place. Islamic scholarships suffer from two problems: “lack of a genuine feel for the relevance of the Qur’an today, which prevents presentation in terms adequate to the needs of contemporary man; but even more a fear that such a presentation, might deviate on some points from traditionally received opinions.” Within this context, we have to define the term “secularization”; it is to separate the polity from religious ideologies and ecclesiastical structures, the expansion of the polity to perform those regulatory functions previously performed by the religious establishment, and, to emphasize temporal goals and rational, pragmatic efforts, or secular political values.

Such an imagination of the Islamic movements is further ignited by the Islamic movements’ self-portrayal as the harbingers of “total” change and “radical revolution” that is normally termed as

Islamic revolution. In a political sociology setting, this research focuses on an empirical example of one of the oldest Islamic movements in the Muslim world, the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan

They are less helpful in determining specific social and economic needs of society and the strategy to overcome them. Political conceptualization of needs must not only diagnose but also prognosticate the issues of the deprived class coupled with identifying symptoms and remedies in the given social context (Sen, 1999).

One reason might be the perpetual secession, disdain for and expulsion of scholars and intellectuals from the JI at various times. As one of the JI's influential elite told me in an interview that the JI's current politics and Maududi's doctrines are not synonymous.^x In real practice, the JI through its perpetual interaction with the existing capitalist system has left the Islamist ideology behind. It is now common observation that political Islamists negotiate their principle positions according to opportunity spaces.

5.7 Conclusion

The above-discussed narrative serves also as a conceptual and material ground for the emergence of the Islamic movements in Pakistan. The JI's strategy for change is thus one of gradualism and the party has a four point programme aimed at transforming society into an Islamic one. The programme includes appeals to intellect and virtue, ideas on social reform and visions of a just leadership. What the JI refers to as an "intellectual revolution" is the very core of the programme. To the defense of JI, it can be said that almost all democratic and military governments that have come to power in Pakistan have tried to use religion to advance their own interests. All wars were termed as jihad to legitimize the states actions and to gain support from amongst the masses. In addition, JI could not spread its roots at the national level due to closed political structures of Pakistani politics.

Maududi's ideas of an Islamic revolution, and its centrality to his ideology were also out of step with the will of the Pakistani electorate. While the Jamaat's agenda did eventually come to include electoral politics, it was the item of lowest priority; Maududi's primary concern was "Islamic

revolution” (Moten 2003: 393). Maududi’s view of revolution – iterative change and improvement over time – was not unlike Trotsky’s concept of the “permanent revolution.” While Maududi’s ideology saw Islamism as transcending the boundaries of the nation-state, he qualified it by adopting an “Islam in Pakistan” platform akin to Stalin’s “socialism in one country” Pakistan, in his view, would be the prototype to which all other Islamist movements could look as a model.

The failure of the Jamaat is all the more glaring because it happens in Pakistan, a country where Islam provides guidance for and regulates every aspect of life and occupies centre stage in the social, economic and political life of all Pakistanis. Admittedly, though the vague but tenaciously held beliefs of the inarticulate, illiterate average Muslim differs from the Islam of the educated, urban and non-practicing Muslims, the imprint of Islam nonetheless is clearly visible.

The JI politicized Islam in Pakistan, but failed to reap any benefits from it. The size of the religious vote has increased markedly since 1947, but not the JI’s share of it. The JI proved the efficacy of Islam as a political force, but it had no means to prevent others from exploiting religion for political gain (Khurram,2001).

All this, however, is a continuing saga. Pakistan is changing, and so is the Jamaat. The political fortunes of the party may yet improve; only time will tell. It is obvious now, however, that operating in the political process, especially in a democracy, will require the party associated with the rise of contemporary Islamic revivalism and which has viewed itself as the “vanguard of the Islamic revolution” to embark upon changes that will inevitably diminish its commitment to its original ideology if it is to succeed.

Chapter 6: Comparison between Jamat-e-Islami and BJP

1. Introduction

In this important chapter, Jamat-e-Islami and BJP are compared against NCIPM, focusing on how both movements are similar and different. As both parties have a dominant middle class support base, it will discuss their commonalities and differences. Furthermore, their ideological potentials are the same. BJP and JI differ in other ways as well, such as the significance of external actors and their strategic preferences.

It will also discuss the commonalities and difference between BJP and JI, as the dominant social support base from Middle class are common between these two parties. Besides that, the elements of ideological potential are also identical. There are some other elements which differentiate between BJP and JI, like significance of external actors and strategic preference.

Moreover, these two movements faced the same historical circumstances and only difference is that BJP got the opportunity to grow in a more democratic atmosphere, while JI could not find such democratic and political atmosphere. Pakistan and India have same political, economic and social circumstances. In fact, basic reason for the comparison between these two parties is that they both fall into category of NCIPM. One more specific difference is that JI is an ideological movement and emphasizes to make Islamic teachings as law of the land, while BJP tries to win the sympathies of the Hindus in the name of Hinduism because Muslims are the biggest second Majority in India.

And JI has no such situation in Pakistan. In fact, the political structure of these both parties lies in the fundamentalism, cultural identity or religion. However, the stress has been laid that how JI is different from other parties in the country.

By comparing the both parties, the chapter aims to address this relatively surprising outcome. It argues that Jamaat-e-Islami's electoral failure in Pakistan can be attributed to the co-optation of its political platform by the state and other actors; its inability to address the politically salient dimensions of ethnic identity in Pakistan; and its elitist ideological disposition.

2. Background

Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru espoused a secular ideology that called on the state not to favor any religion, to extend equal rights to all religious communities, and to grant minorities special protections and privileges.

Serving as India's prime minister from independence in 1947 until his death in 1964, Nehru attempted to translate these secular ideals into the state's political philosophy. But Indian secularism was frowned upon by both radical Muslims and Hindu nationalists. For radical Muslims, the ideal remained an Islamic state and universal Islamic revolution.

Hindu nationalists, on the other hand, embraced the ideology of Hindutva, which insists that India's identity be defined in terms of its Hindu origins and that religions of foreign origin, such as Islam and Christianity, be reduced to a subordinate position in India's national life.

The post-partition era has also seen the steady presence of Hindu fundamentalist groups in India's polity, highlighted since the 1990s by the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, or Indian People's Party). The BJP was formed in 1980 but traces its origins to the Hindu Maha Sabha (Hindu Grand Assembly), which was founded in 1915 to defend Hindus against Muslim influence.

The BJP rose to prominence in the early 1990s when it started a campaign to rebuild Hindu temples on sites where India's Muslim rulers had allegedly constructed mosques after demolishing temples. This campaign provoked a violent dispute at Ayodhya in northern India on December 6, 1992, when thousands of Hindutva volunteers tore down the sixteenth-century Babri Masjid (Babar's Mosque, named after the first Mughal emperor).

First, I will discuss which elements are identical between BJP and JI as new emerging political parties. The stance of these both political parties is based on the concept of culturally declared identity in the dissidence of secularism. With this vision, they show a chancy preferential stance for the policies of free market.

The research of these both political parties, which focus on the cultural identity, is based on 'fundamentalism'. But the apostasy of political system by a fundamentalist is in the influence of the dissidence of secularism in spite of the socio-economic agenda.

Cultural identity has no direct relationship with rent or profit but the politicians can use it as a tool to win support in different social classes and even in class-transcending social groups. An example of class transcending concept of cultural national identity is Secularism.

Secular national identity represents same interests for all members of community, opposite to class oriented social treatment. However, cultural identity may sometimes be used to mobilize people against others. This approach has been classified in literature mostly as 'Fundamentalism' and considered as undesired. However, secularism can become established elite's adopted-identity to discourage the emergence of political groups mobilized by the concepts of cultural identity.

The middle class is rapidly decreasing day by day in Pakistan because some of the people out of middle class have moved to the upper class and others have gone into the category of lower class due to fluctuation of economic policies and political crisis. The number of middle class may further decrease in the coming years. In fact, the current situation of the middle class in Pakistan is in trouble and cannot bear any further economic recession and dearness.^{xi}

BJP always start propaganda against Pakistan and the Muslims during elections to manipulate the emotions and sentiments of the Hindu in the name of Hindu Nationalism. While on the other hand, there is no large number of Hindu in Pakistan and hence JI cannot take votes by provoking the sentiments of people against Hindus in the name of Muslim Nationalism.

In fact, BJP promotes Hindu Nationalism in India because it is in their interest and they win support and vote in this way but JI cannot chant the popular slogan of Muslim Nationalism because the Founder of the JI Maulana Mudadi was against this idea.¹

BJP mainly wins its strength and support from the lower and middle class while JI has so far failed to get popular support from the lower class because they are not educated enough to understand somewhat complicated theory and philosophy of JI and moreover, they are too busy in earning their bread and butter that have no time to pay attention to this aspect. While middle class is also in hard times due to the failed economic policies and the number of middle class has considerably reduced to an extent.^{xii}

¹ See interviews Data from 2013 to 2016 as an attachment (Part 3).

6.3 Religion and Politics: A Study of Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami is a biggest religion-based political party in Pakistan. It is not only a party but also an ideological movement and an Islamic organisation. It aspires to transform the political, social, religious, cultural and economic structure of Pakistan according to Islamic Sharia Law.

It has exclusive membership process, networks and strong organisational structure from local to national level. Its presence in socio-economic and Muslim cultural activities is noteworthy in Bangladeshi society. Its emergence has had major implications in the changing socio-political character of the country. It has accelerated the Islamisation of Pakistani society which has had the effect of disturbing religious tolerance and increasing violence in the country.

According to the liberal theoretical framework, the process of modernisation in society leads to a separation of religion from politics. The development of modern political institutions and the significance of religion gets diminished in the modern stage (Giddens & Griffiths 2006). According to this theory, religion becomes a subordinate issue in political life when society is modernised, and it gradually disappears from the affairs of the state. Weinstein (2010) found the following: Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Weber, and Durkheim, (for example) all considered secularization to be the wave of the future. They believed that the separation of sacred concerns from everyday life and the subordination of religious values and institutions to civil authority were inherent parts of modern institutions. In fact, one gets a strong sense from these earlier accounts that Kumar(2017).

Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 7, No.5, pp. 146-165. 147 2006). According to this theory, religion becomes a subordinate issue in political life when society is modernised, and it gradually disappears from the affairs of the state. Weinstein (2010) found the following: Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Weber, and Durkheim, (for example) all considered secularization to be the wave of the future.

They believed that the separation of sacred concerns from everyday life and the subordination of religious values and institutions to civil authority were inherent parts of modern institutions. In fact, one gets a strong sense from these earlier accounts that religion, on the one hand, and democracy, capitalism, and individualism, on the other cannot coexist for long and that religion will inevitably yield to modernity (p. 94). Religion, on the one hand, and democracy, capitalism,

and individualism, on the other cannot coexist for long and that religion will inevitably yield to modernity (p. 94)

6.4 The Islamist Politics and The Case of Jamaat-E-Islami Pakistan

The essentialist theoretical approaches assume Islamic movements, if got access to state power, will lead their respective societies to a kind of totalitarian state, a condition resulting into complete destruction of the existing social, political and cultural traditions and replacing them with new political institutions.(Husnul Amin)

Globalization in this paper is defined as “time-space compression” in global economic, cultural and socio-political relations. Neoliberalism refers to both economic theory and a policy prescription. As theoretical construct, neoliberalism promotes a free market economy with less governmental control and regulation. The neoliberal ideology views that less regulation and more freedom guarantees economic efficiency, growth and distributional justice (Kotz, 2002)

6.5 JI--- Political Party or Political Movement

Political movements are different from political parties since movements are usually focused on a single issue and they have no interest in attaining office in government. A political movement is generally an informal organization and uses unconventional methods to achieve their goals.

Regarding JI, Jama‘at-i Islami religious party by Mawdūdī . The party was established to reform society in accordance with the faith and drew its inspiration from the model of Islamic state but later turned into political party. It called for moral reform and political action but was not concerned with questions of nationalism or national boundaries because Islam is a universal religion. It started to turned into political party .

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan is distinct among contemporary Islamic movements in that it had strong democratic traditions right from its inception in 1941; has a written constitution to govern its organization; and has always operated within the framework of the country’s constitution. It seeks to bring about societal transformation is through appealing to the intellect, organizing communities, and rallying masses around its program—just like any other political party in the East or West. It

believes that Islam provides a universal and dynamic vision of life that is valid and relevant for human welfare in all times and places.

6.5 Focus on Elections

While its ideological impact has been fairly broad, Jamaat has thus far had limited success in parliamentary elections. There are several reasons for this. Jamaat's distinctive organizational structure is frequently cited as a reason for its limited electoral victories. Some analysts noted that our organizational structure is more suitable for a revolutionary struggle, and not necessarily parliamentary elections. Jamaat leaders like Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Khurram Murad, and Khurshid Ahmad have expressed the need to adopt a more open and broad-based organization suitable to political campaigning. This is despite the fact that Jamaat is considered the most internally democratic party in Pakistan, one that particularly obsessed with winning elections as much as they are keen on participating in them. For us, mass communication of our message conducts regular elections at each level of the organization. A report published by a think tank, the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), testifies to this fact. At times, one feels a lethargic contentedness among some of Jamaat's leaders and members, despite its poor electoral performance. They are not is an objective in its own right, and elections provide an occasion for this. This approach has been the subject of debate within Jamaat for quite some time now.

The electoral success of Islamically-oriented political parties in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia has underlined the need for bringing about basic changes in political strategy and organizational structure. Jamaat certainly wishes to broaden its social base to achieve greater electoral success as well as to have a more pragmatic structure that encourages influential personalities to run for leadership positions, rather than treating them as equal to ordinary members. Jamaat experimented with the Pakistan Islamic Front and a youth organization named Pasban in the early 1990s, creating quite a stir in national politics, but elections came too early for them to properly prepare. These innovative structures created friction among the old guard and the new recruits within the organization, and consequently, they were rolled back after the 1993 elections to maintain organizational unity.

6.6 JI in Contemporary Era

As the opportunity spaces in the realm of politics, economy, media and social sector expanded, the JI has diversified its responses as well as activities. The JI's response diversification shows that it has slowly moved away from its main project of establishing an authoritarian Islamic state to an idea that accepts pluralism. Although due to numerous inner dynamics (party's immediate past, lack of charismatic leadership, intellectual deficit, Mawudid's ideological burden, failure of the JI in negotiating its normative framework) the JI largely failed making it a popular party winning considerable public will; yet, evidence coming from multiple sources strongly suggests steadily growing diversification and accommodation.

The empirical evidence provided in this study reflects the diversity of JI's responses both across issues and across time. Using multiple sources of information, the politics of the JI indicates that its response has not been homogenous rather has been oscillating between rejection, negotiation and accommodation. Why did the JI reject, then negotiate and later even accommodate globalization and its opportunities? The main proposition to be tested in this paper is: the more opportunity spaces are opened up for the JI as a result of neoliberal globalization, the more it negotiates its hard line anti-globalization stance, softens its normative framework and opens up to cross-cultural interactions.

Following Jamaat's experience in the Combined Opposition Parties, Jamaat itself had evolved in both its outlook and its structure. The party was now 'controlled by leaders who received modern educations, who maintained only informal ties with Islamic entities,' and by no means 'were bound by their norms and discipline'. The party was also opening its gates to an onslaught of 'lower middle class young men' who had been educated in the Western tradition. Today, the party still straddles both its hesitation to the political process and its deep rooted political ambitions, but does so more comfortably.

To an extent, it has accepted its identity as a political party, but still insists that the ultimate goal remains a peaceful Islamic revolution. Today, its platform includes calls to action to remedy pressing socio-political issues, but employs Islamic rhetoric as the solution to these ills. Siraj-ul-Haq, the Jamaat's current Amir, argues that 'Jamaat-e-Islami has chalked out a plan for the next 25 years for Pakistan'.

6.7 JI and Failure in Election

Pakistan's Islamist parties have contributed richly to the Pakistani politics, at some points, even leading the charge to crystallise the country's Islamic identity. At the same time, however, the growing influence of Pakistan's Islamists has been a source of great concern for the powers that be.

Since the inception of the state of Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami has played a pivotal role in advancing Islamic doctrines as the normative standard for codified law. Since its birth in 1941, the party has not only advocated for an Islamic state, but it has also resisted secularising forces, notably the Muslim League led by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Despite being one of the oldest Islamist social movements in Pakistan, the Jamaat boasts a mere four seats in the National Assembly making it one of the weakest and least represented parties in the Parliament. By all accounts, the Jamaat has failed as a political party and future prospects look equally as unpromising.

Why then has the party failed? Jamaat has suffered from an acute identity crisis, simultaneously straddling both anti-statism and a desire to evolve into a competitive political force in Pakistan. Its positioning of itself as a purely Islamic movement unwilling to participate in the nation-state model and its simultaneous characterisation of itself as a domestic political force resulted in not only confusion about the mission of the organisation but also disunity within party ranks. Today, while Jamaat-e-Islami is comfortable acting as a domestic political force and has resolved its ideological cleavages, its consistent electoral failures can also be explained by the period in which authoritarianism remained as a dominant status-quo.

In order to understand Jamaat-e-Islami's political failure, the institution's roots must be traced back to Abul A'la Maududi — founder and primary ideologue of the movement. We can subdivide Abul A'la Maududi into two distinct personalities: the ideologue and the politician. Both personalities emerged in two distinct phases, and both emerged as means to two different ends. For Maududi, the Jamaat would remain anti-statist, at least in the early years of its existence, viewing the political process as deviation from its objectives of spreading Islamic revivalism.

Struggle for the restoration of democracy can be traced back to 1981, when MRD (multiparty oppositional coalition) was formally established for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. The

movement firstly appealed to the legacy of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his populist program, but with the passage of time the movement demanded the end of martial law and the restoration of democracy. The movement compelled the military ruler, when he conducted election on non-party basis in 1985, and then promised that national election will be held in 1988. However, the sudden death of General Zia in a plane crash on 17 august 1988 made possible to held general election. The sudden death of general Zia was a dramatic exit for military establishment. The afghan jihad was in final stage and they did not want any interference from democratic forces. The army prepared a new strategy for exercising political power indirectly, and to counter the Pakistan People party. Thus they re-grouped pro-military political parties and Islamist groups under the banner of Islamic Democratic Alliance for the elections of 1988 and afterwards (Nasr, 1992).

6.8 Ideological difference between JI and BJP

The Jamaat wishes to change existing political order and system and to establish Islamic state, a political and social system based parliamentary democracy with a theocratic Islamic state, which will have no place for nationalism (Karleka 2005):

The JI's nationalism is camouflaged under the party's ideologies and operations. It is somewhat similar to Pervez Musharraf's famous slogan, 'Sab se pehlay...Pakistan' ('First of all...Pakistan'), but the JI's intention and access is globalized with affiliations with similar pan-Islamic movements in other parts of the world. Islamic nationalism in Pakistan emerged out of the insecure pre-Partition atmosphere, when the Muslim League had demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent.

The JI, particularly Maududi, was sceptical of the fact that the Muslim League or Congress Party represented the Muslims. The idea of the JI was initially anti-Muslim League and anti-Congress, and in the postPartition period the party slowly moved from anti-India to antiWest, and currently anti-US as well as against the so-called Jewish lobby. However, over the course of the past six decades, the JI has been practising street power with slogans in resistance to democratic leaders, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and in recent times opposing the dictatorship of Musharraf. Overall, the JI was denouncing the secularism of Bhutto and the pro-West 'enlightened moderation' of Musharraf.

Jamat-e-Islami is possessed of its own tenacious ideology and objectives. The party represents a particular stance based on the Islamic ideology that this world has been created by Allah, therefore; sovereignty belongs to him and only his orders must be obeyed². When people establish their governments in the world the situation deteriorates due to their vested interests and ulterior motives. Thus Islam's ideology is that mankind must adopt the way as prescribed by Allah. The organizations gained momentum rapidly because it offered an authentic Islamic cultural identity during a period of Muslim identity crisis, and efficiently tried to redress the social, economic and political problems in the light of Islamic teachings, which were ignored by the modern era.³

The research of these both political parties, which focus on the cultural identity, is based on 'fundamentalism'. But the apostasy of political system by a fundamentalist is in the influence of the dissidence of secularism in spite of the socio-economic agenda.

Secular national identity represents same interests for all members of community, opposite to class oriented social treatment. However, cultural identity may sometimes be used to mobilize people against others. This approach has been classified in literature mostly as 'Fundamentalism' and considered as undesired. However secularism can become established elite's adopted-identity to discourage the emergence of political groups mobilized by the concepts of cultural identity.⁴

While the BJP is more overtly culturo-nationalist, culture has influenced the foreign policy approaches of both major parties. It has impacted leaders' preferences and perceptions and, to a lesser extent, public opinion.

Jamaat-e-Islami tried to justify the first Muslim ideologue to fully articulate the notion of an "Islamic state," which emerged as a synthesis of his theology and postcolonial nationalism.⁵

Jamaat-e-Islami draws support for its platform mainly from the young, urbanized, educated classes of Pakistan (Siddiqui 2010: 1)⁶, including professionals and business people (Bashir 2009: 20)

6.9 The comparison of Jamat-e-Islami and BJP

The two movements Jamaat-e-Islami from Pakistan and BJP from India have same political, economic and social circumstances to some extent. However, the fate of these two movements are different where it comes to the power politics because BJP got the opportunity to grow in a more democratic atmosphere, while JI could not find such democratic and political atmosphere. In fact, basic reason for the comparison between these two parties is that they both fall into category of NCIPM.

Moreover, the democratic institutions have invariably been instable and weak in Pakistan as compared to those of India. Therefore, democracy has not flourished full-fledged in Pakistan so far and this is the main impediment in the development of NCIPM. Furthermore, feudalism is deeply rooted in Pakistani society in different certain areas and feudal and the influential have monopoly over main constituencies and main institutions of the country and voter cannot vote on their own choice in these areas, and many votes are casted on the basis of casts and sects.

Religious revival in the postcolonial era is not limited to newly independent Muslim countries. The Buddhist upsurge in Sri Lanka, the Hindu revival in India, and the recent Sikh reassertion in Indian Punjab are no less important than the activities of Islamic fundamentalist parties. From this perspective, Islamic fundamentalist revivalism in Muslim countries might be understood as a search for identity and reassertion of tradition in transitional societies.

What might be of interest in the context of Muslim societies, however, is the emergence of disciplined, organized, and mass-based fundamentalist political groups that aim at restructuring the affairs of the state and reorganizing social relations on Islamic principles.⁷

5.1 Hindu nationalism and BJP

In India, Hindu nationalism, also known as Hindutva, seeks to establish a Hindu India (Hindu Rashtra) that visualizes a Hindu —self and the minority (Muslim & Christian) other. “Hindutva is an ideology propagated by the Hindu rightwing elements that aspire to establish India as a Hindu state by uniting the Hindus who are divided along the lines of caste, class, language and other differences. Hindutva is on the ascendance in India in the last 25 years.

Hindu nationalism developed as a way to form a specifically Indian national identity which stood against both the British colonizers and the Islamic dynasty that preceded it. This was articulated by Vinayak Savarkar – an atheist – who wrote a pamphlet in 1928 called “Hinduta”⁸.

What strategies and tactics have the adherents of this chauvinistic, sectarian movement employed in order to gain an ideological, cultural, organizational and political foothold in a caste-ridden, multi-religious, multi-linguistic, secular, pluralist and democratic society dependent on coalition politics?

The BJP was formed in 1980, drawing together a range of Hindu activist projects, from Gandhian to more explicitly Hindu nationalist. The BJP has become known for its mass campaigns to mobilise Hindus. Days of rioting in the western Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 saw the shared faith spaces such as the tomb of the poet Vali Gujarati razed in what has been called a “systematic attempt to wipe out an entire culture”. The morning after, a statue of the Hindu God Hanuman had been placed on top of the rubble. Maya Kodnani, a former BJP state minister, was convicted of murder and incitement to murder during the riots.

In 2014, the BJP was elected to national government with Narendra Modi as its president. And this, of course, challenges one of Hindu nationalism’s central concerns: the building of Hindu unity, and translating this into an idea of the nation. What this all tells us then is that with the BJP encountering dissent as it defines India and Hinduism, Hindu nationalism’s diverse and eventful history looks sure to continue.

Mawdudi believed the Muslim culture had been diluted from centuries of influence from the Hindu culture (Nasr, 1996, 6). Muslim Punjabis could relate more with Hindu Punjabis than their co-religionists in Bengal. Similarly, Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims had more in common than with people from their own religions (Mukherjee, 2010, 323).

Mawdudi intended to remove what he thought were impurities from the Muslim culture. He called for unity amongst the Muslims and separation from the Hindu culture (Nasr, 1996, 6). In Mawdudi’s eyes, the Jamaat-e-Islami was not just for the Indian Muslims but rather the Muslim umma (community) at large. The vision was pan-Islamist in nature and Mawdudi hoped his party to transcend the national boundaries to encompass all peoples and countries (Jackson, 2011, 79).

Initially, Mawdudi had rejected the creation of an independent state for Muslims but later moved to Pakistan after its independence. He dreamed of making Pakistan an Islamic state, a model, that the rest of the Muslim states could emulate (Mukherjee, 2010, 331). To the dismay of Mawdudi, his party and its supporters, this dream would not only fall short of coming true but Jamaat-e-Islami's transformation from a social movement to a political party would result in embarrassing election outcomes.

Roy Jackson in his book 'Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam' writes "Mawdudi portrayed the Jamaat as the moral guardians of Pakistan: a holy community that did not dirty its hands in the mud of political wrangling" (Jackson, 2011, 71). Indeed, the JI initially limited its role in Pakistan to spreading Islam's message and social work for the refugees who had migrated from India (Ali, 2010, 220).

6.10. Democracy:

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India fortunately developed democratic culture at the very first stage of its independence. Though Indian democracy also needs much improvement but it is obviously and comparatively better than that of Pakistan. India became free only in 1947 after many years of colonial rule. In the following years India had her constitution that declared India as a democratic federal republic. The first democratic election on the basis of universal adult franchise was held in 1952. BJP fully benefitted

from the democratic system of India and on the other hand, in Pakistan democratic values and culture could not flourish. Since its independence, Pakistan's democratic system has fluctuated between civilian and military governments at various times throughout its political history, mainly due to political instability, civil-military conflicts, political corruption. So in this undemocratic atmosphere JI could not fully exercise its capacity to give awareness to the people.⁹

6.11. Electoral Process:

India has also a better free and fair electoral system than that of Pakistan that is the substance of democratic system in which people choose their own representatives consciously . The Election Commission , that conduct the election free and fair, is independent in Indian , but the electoral system in Pakistan has never been free and fair . In general elections, the most influential, the rich, and corrupt people contest elections because contesting elections need a lot of money, contacts and rigging. A common man even educated man without huge resources cannot take part in elections. And this is the main reason that JI could not make a huge success in the general elections so far because its candidates are not so rich and it is an ideological party and does not believe in rigging and corruption. Unfair elections are a great set-back to the JI's politics.¹⁰

6.12. Agriculture reforms in India

In the years since its independence, India has made immense progress towards food security. Indian population has tripled, and food-grain production more than quadrupled. There has been a substantial increase in available food-grain per capita.

Before the mid-1960s India relied on imports and food aid to meet domestic requirements. However, two years of severe drought in 1965 and 1966 convinced India to reform its agricultural policy and that they could not rely on foreign aid and imports for food security. India adopted significant policy reforms focused on the goal of food grain self-sufficiency. This ushered in India's Green Revolution. It began with the decision to adopt superior yielding, disease resistant wheat

⁹ See interviews Data from 2013 to 2016 as an attachment (Part 3).

varieties in combination with better farming knowledge to improve productivity. The state of Punjab led India's green revolution and earned the distinction of being the country's bread basket.¹¹

At the time of Independence, India inherited a semi-feudal agrarian structure with onerous tenure arrangements. The ownership and control of land was highly concentrated in a few landlords and intermediaries. Thus, the agricultural land resource of India was gradually impoverished because economic motivation tended towards exploitation rather than investment.

6.13. Land Reforms in Pakistan:

Inequality in land ownership has been blamed alternately for poverty, social and technological backwardness, and political disempowerment. It is widely held that redistributive land reforms – that is, state's takeover of land from large landowners and its allotment to the landless or land-poor -- were slow to take off in Pakistan and did not achieve a great deal due to the political power wielded by the landowning classes .

LAND reforms in Pakistan have a long and somewhat chequered history. The British had less of an interest in the matter as they relied on the support of several influential landlords. Although there had been some limited reforms in the years leading up to 1947, all major reforms date from the years after independence. Almost immediately the various provincial legislatures passed several statutes whereby the jagirdari systems were abolished and tenants protected. The major reforms, however, came in three stages: the first during Ayub Khan's martial law in 1959; the second and third during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's rule in the 1970s.

Ayub Khan's government passed the first major piece of legislation concerning land reforms in Pakistan. This legislation was the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation 1959 (Regulation 64 of 1959). The salient features of this regulation included a ceiling on individual holdings. No one individual could own more than 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres of unirrigated land or a maximum of 36,000 Produce Index Units (PIU), whichever was greater. It further allowed that land be redistributed amongst tenants and others. In addition, the regulation contained provisions which provided for security of tenants as well as for preventing the subdivision of land holdings.

Now, sixty years later, India seems to me to be a robust democracy, with a vibrant economy while Pakistan is still struggling for the durable democracy and economic prosperity and political stability

6.14 . Education and Corruption

Since early years, India focused on creating and developing many educational institutes of high caliber. Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Indian Institute of Management (IIM) and Indian Institute of Science (IISc) have created many educated Indians who succeeded extensively in their respective fields and contributed to India's success. Many of today's global CEOs of Indian origin have graduated from IITs and IIMs.¹²

Corruption has become synonymous with our existing system and is pushing our nation to a dead end. Favoritism, nepotism, misappropriation of public fund, bad debts and misuse of power are on the rise. Corruption has gained roots in our society because of wrong decisions and weak policies of the successive governments. The agencies responsible for checking corruption have completely failed in their mission. Thus accountability seems non-existent. First of all we must define the corruption. Apparently, it would look like suspicious financial transaction alone. But that is too narrow view. Corruption today has become a way of life and it encompasses the ideological, moral and ethical values of society. It has become a part of our culture.

The term right-wing extremism has come to be associated with political movements which have their ideological roots in nationalism which the State and the people amalgamate to form a single unity.

In the context of South Asia, Pakistan and India have had to grapple with a serious problem of right-wing extremism since the last three decades. Debates on the measures to tackle the activities of Islamist organizations in Pakistan and Hindutva forces in India are an intrinsic part of the discourse in political, public and academic circles in both these countries.

Before we move on to the specific attributes of right-wing extremism in India, it would be useful to trace the emergence of right-wing politics, which has undergone phases of extremism. Right-

wing politics has drawn the attention of researchers and the media in recent years, particularly after the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992 and the subsequent emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a dominant force in Indian politics.

The events in Gujarat after February 2002, which included the burning of the Sabarmati Express train and the subsequent communal riots, were analysed as not only the revival of rightwing politics, but also the consolidation of the same. In India, the politics of the right wing has been studied under the umbrella of what is termed Hindu nationalism.

6.15 . Middle class

The middle class is rapidly decreasing day by day in Pakistan because some of the people out of middle class have moved to the upper class and others have gone into the category of lower class due to fluctuation of economic policies and political crisis. The number of middle class may further decrease in the coming years. In fact, the current situation of the middle class in Pakistan is in trouble and cannot bear any further economic recession and dearness.

In the beginning, illiterate people were not given the core membership of Jamat. However, Jamat had to change its policy and since the last two decades, many illiterate people have been admitted as core members. For them, various courses are being arranged so that they can understand the true concept of Islam.

While BJP has attracted middle class in the wake of agricultural and industrial revolution. The results of election 2013 reflect the popularity maintained by the BJP in the middle class.

Delhi's youth and the middle class voted for the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in the 2013 Assembly elections, but were enamoured by Narendra Modi's promise of development in the Lok Sabha elections. The BJP won all the seven seats in Delhi in the Lok Sabha, increasing its vote share from 33 per cent that it bagged in the 2013 Assembly to 46 per cent barely four months later in the Lok Sabha elections. That the middle class voted in greater numbers helped the AAP in 2013 Assembly and the BJP in 2014 Lok Sabha elections.¹³

6.16 . Martial Law

Democracy failed soon after independence due to the political instability, the civilian bureaucracy and military assumed governing power in 1958. Since its independence, Pakistan's democratic system has fluctuated between civilian and military governments at various times throughout its history. Democracy in Pakistan, however, imperfect has never been allowed to function. Military dictator have been ousted the political governments on one or the other pretexts. Since there has not been democratic system functional, JI as political party had no much opportunity to show the results as BJP has delivered in the Indian democracy.

6.17 . Alliance with other small Parties:

Another reason of the success of the BJP is the alliance with the small Parties to form the government. While JI is an ideological party and only tries to make its alliance with the ideological and religious parties. In fact, these other religious parties are not so strong to form the government. JI cannot make alliance with any corrupt or secular party.

In 2002, JI succeeded in making government in one province of Pakistan KPK (then-called NWFP) in alliance with other religious parties. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council of Action), was a political alliance consisting of Islamist, religious, and far-right parties of Pakistan that opposes President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The Jamaat-e-Islami as part of the MMA secured 53 seats in 2002.

In the end , this alliance could not extend too long because every other party belonged to a specific religious school of thought exercising their own local , provincial and sectarian idea and agenda while JI is a national party having an ideology. BJP makes alliance with other parties in the name of hindu Nationalism.

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from the democratic system of India and on the other hand, in Pakistan democratic values and culture could not flourish. Since its independence, Pakistan's democratic system has fluctuated between civilian and military governments at various times throughout its political history, mainly due to political instability, civil-military conflicts, political corruption. So in this undemocratic atmosphere JI could not fully exercise its capacity to give awareness to the people.¹⁴

6.18. Difference between JI and other contemporary Political-religious parties:

Jamaat-e-Islamic is different from other political parties in many different ways: Firstly, it has very organized structure from top to bottom. Secondly, there is no hierarchical system or dynasty in the party that is basically against the principles of democracy. All party leadership is elected by its members. Thirdly, it is not corrupt at all, the system in the party is so organized and transparent that corruption is not possible. Finally, it believes in the change through ballot.¹⁵

JI represents all people regardless their creed, sect, color, race etc. As there is no democracy in our traditional political parties, likewise there is no democracy in the religious parties as well, and that is the dilemma of our politics. In religious parties, normally one person is the head of the party and he selects next head as second command on his own choice and after his removal or death, his son becomes the head of the party so this is like the dynasty and no democratic way.

6.19. Performance in electoral process

In the given political circumstances, JI has emerged as NCIPM and is a mainstream political party based on the cultural and Islamic identity; however, it is struggling in the Electorate. JI needs to formulate the strategy to cope with the major hurdles of ethnic politics and non-political actors.

Cognizant of the current political dynamics and cultural scenario, Jamaat-e-Islami employs keywords such as “feudals,” “class,” “masses,” and “liberation” – “words usually associated with left leaning intellectuals” (Moten 2003: 401). It remains to be seen whether this more populist tact will reverse the Jamaat’s electoral fortunes.

¹⁴ See interviews Data from 2013 to 2014 as an attachment (Part 3).

¹⁵ See interviews Data from 2013 to 2014 as an attachment (Part 3).

BJP has done well in the electoral process and remained successful in forming government. While some of JI's own policies resulted in its failures, there were factors beyond the party's control that also contributed towards its poor performance in the elections. The JI started off as a platform for Mawdudi's ideas. However, later conflicts developed on the objectives and vision of the party. JI as a political party had to make certain compromises that did not go in parallel with its ideology. For example, in 1965, JI was supporting Fatima Jinnah for her presidential campaign against Ayub Khan even though it was against Mawdudi's views on the social role of women (Nasr, 1996, 44). Moreover, by siding with General Zia after the fall of Bhutto's regime, JI showed its willingness to work with authoritarian regimes to achieve its objectives. This created an unfriendly relationship between the JI and other political parties.

6.18. Conclusion

Keeping certain important points in view, why JI has not played such role as BJP has done in India. In this regard, first important point is the influence of Rent and city classes. Besides, not only secular parties, but also the secular groups and parties are also a big hurdle in the way of JI and this gives birth to certain questions.

The two movements Jamaat-e-Islami from Pakistan and BJP from India have same political, economic and social circumstances to some extent. However, the fate of these two movements are different where it comes to the power politics because BJP got the opportunity to grow in a more democratic atmosphere, while JI could not find such democratic and political atmosphere. In fact, basic reason for the comparison between these two parties is that they both fall into category of NCIPM.

Moreover, the democratic institutions have invariably been instable and weak in Pakistan as compared to those of India. Therefore, democracy has not flourished full-fledged in Pakistan so far and this is the main impediment in the development of NCIPM. Furthermore, feudalism is deeply rooted in Pakistani society in different certain areas and feudal and the influential have monopoly over main constituencies and main institutions of the country and voter cannot vote on their own choice in these areas, and many votes are casted on the basis of casts and sects.

All democratic and military governments that have come to power in Pakistan have tried to use religion to advance their own interests. All wars were termed as jihad to legitimize the states actions

and to gain support from amongst the masses (Mukherjee, 2010, 338)¹⁶ Also, JI could not spread its roots at the national level due to closed political structures of Pakistani politics. When Pakistan is not under martial law, it's either the Pakistan People's party or the Pakistan Muslim League that is in power. These parties contest elections by fielding candidates who are either feudal or business tycoons. Votes are forced or bought. On the other hand most of JI's candidates come from the middle class and only rely on Islam's message to attract voters.

The JI has not only failed to achieve its objective but also moved away from it while trying to make compromises to achieve political success. With a huge Muslim population, Pakistan remains a country where religion is very important. However, while people would like to see god fearing politicians, they would not like religion to be the basis for all the political decisions. For parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami, it is better to act as pressure groups, keeping a check on government's policies by voicing concern where the policies are found to be in contrast with Islamic teachings.

A democratic government will allow these voices to be heard in order to reach an understanding. The JI's electoral misfortunes should tell us that the dream of establishing a shariah state is, if not impossible, unnecessary and unwelcome in Pakistan. The politicization of Islam and Islamization of politics will only lead to the abuse of religion for political purposes and vice versa.

Chapter 7: Why Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) failed to play such a Political role in Pakistan as (BJP) has played in India.

Introduction:

The chapter tries to explore whether Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) can play such a Political role in Pakistan in the contemporary circumstances as Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has played in India. Keeping certain important points in view, why JI has not played such role as BJP has done in India. In this regard, first important point is the influence of Rent and city classes. Besides, not only secular parties, but also the secular groups and parties are also a big hurdle in the way of JI and this gives birth to certain questions.

The two movements Jamaat-e-Islami from Pakistan and BJP from India have same political, economic and social circumstances to some extent. However, the fate of these two movements are different where it comes to the power politics because BJP got the opportunity to grow in a more democratic atmosphere, while JI could not find such democratic and political atmosphere. In fact, basic reason for the comparison between these two parties is that they both fall into category of NCIPM.

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It will be discussed that what are the reasons for such circumstances. And last but not the least, army has a played a decisive role in Pakistani Politics. I will discuss all these elements and try to pinpoint the reason on this basis that why JI has not played such a role as BJP has done in India, whether it is possible for JI to do the same if the same atmosphere is available to JI?

Pakistan is a deeply religious country with over 95 percent of its population being Muslim (Rais, 2011, 22). Although the Pakistani military has ruled Pakistan for most of the years since it gained independence from India in 1947, Pakistan remains a democratic republic with elections being held at the national and provincial levels over the past few decades (Tanwir, 2002, 252).

In this chapter, I will explain in the light of the collected data, whether Jamat-e-Islam can play such role in the given circumstances in Pakistan as BJP has played in India.

7.2 The Role of JI

In its initial years, the JI came out as an academically motivated organisation, which aimed at bringing a revolution without participating in elections. But in later years, amidst strong opposition from its own quarters, the party stepped in the electoral arena.

Political analyst and senior journalist (Mazhar Abbas) however, thinks that merely having ‘honest’ and ‘competent’ candidates, or lodging a protest for civic amenities was not enough for winning elections.

“The JI can and does perform better in the local bodies elections, but the dynamics of provincial and national elections are completely different,” he says

He says there is a general sect-based outlook that is associated with every religious party in Pakistan, due to which they fail to get votes from across the board. “Religious parties will have to shun this impression if they want to perform any better in next elections,” he added.

7.3 Discussion

To the defence of JI, it can be said that almost all democratic and military governments that have come to power in Pakistan have tried to use religion to advance their own interests. All wars were termed as jihad to legitimize the states actions and to gain support from amongst the masses (Mukherjee, 2010, 338) Also, JI could not spread its roots at the national level due to closed political structures of Pakistani politics. When Pakistan is not under martial law, its either the Pakistan People’s party or the Pakistan Muslim League that is in power. These parties contest elections by fielding candidates who are either feudal or business tycoons. Votes are forced or

bought. On the other hand most of JI's candidates come from the middle class and only rely on Islam's message to attract voters.

Arguably, its peak time in the electoral politics was in the 2002 elections when it fought elections from the platform of the MMA and won as many as five national assembly and seven seats of the Sindh Assembly. In later years, however, different factors played their role in the erosion of the JI's support base.

7.4 Why JI Failed

While some of JI's own policies resulted in its failures, there were factors beyond the party's control that also contributed towards its poor performance in the elections. The JI started off as a platform for Mawdudi's ideas. However, later conflicts developed on the objectives and vision of the party. JI as a political party had to make certain compromises that did not go in parallel with its ideology. For example, in 1965, JI was supporting Fatima Jinnah for her presidential campaign against Ayub Khan even though it was against Mawdudi's views on the social role of women (Nasr, 1996, 44). Moreover, by siding with General Zia after the fall of Bhutto's regime, JI showed its willingness to work with authoritarian regimes to achieve its objectives. This created an unfriendly relationship between the JI and other political parties.

As a pressure group, JI had done well in having the government respond to their concerns and demands but because of its hardline approach, JI as a political party failed to gain popularity at a national level. Even though Mawdudi tried to create unity under the banner of Islam, the different sects within Islam undermined the role of Islam as the uniting force. In addition, some of the offshoot groups of JI became involved in militancy and sectarianism (Kumar, 2001, 278). Kumar (2001) states "These organizations which divided the Islamic political forces, fuelled extremism and sectarian violence, and further alienated the people from religious politics."

From a political perspective, a political party cannot succeed in the participatory model if it rejects the existing system. In other words, a political party, which questions the legitimacy of the existing framework, will inevitably draw significant

7.5 JI's Identity Crisis

JI have contributed richly to the Pakistani politics, at some points, even leading the charge to crystallise the country's Islamic identity. At the same time, however, the growing influence of Pakistan's Islamists has been a source of great concern for the powers that be.

Why then has the party failed? Jamaat has suffered from an acute identity crisis, simultaneously straddling both anti-statism and a desire to evolve into a competitive political force in Pakistan. Its positioning of itself as a purely Islamic movement unwilling to participate in the nation-state model and its simultaneous characterisation of itself as a domestic political force resulted in not only confusion about the mission of the organisation but also disunity within party ranks. Today, while Jamaat-e-Islami is comfortable acting as a domestic political force and has resolved its ideological cleavages, its consistent electoral failures can also be explained by the period in which authoritarianism remained as a dominant status-quo.

Jamaat's inability to discern its institutional identity reveals itself for the first time; the organisation attempts to simultaneously pursue an active role in forging the identity of a state, but refuses to swear allegiance to it. Jamaat, in its fervent anti-nationalism, had raised the prospects of Pakistan, in its entirety, being an un-Islamic creation — a major threat to the Muslim League's legitimacy.

7.5 JI and Other Religious Parties

Islamic parties in Pakistan have been a potent force to reckon with and can be counted among the elite groups that influence political processes and decision-making in Pakistan. They have established a definite place for themselves among the various elite groups that determine political processes and decision-making in Pakistan, which include the military, bureaucratic, Punjabi, and business elite. They have a significant influence on the politics of Pakistan and have a tremendous amount of street power, despite the fact that they have never been able to do well in terms of votes in Pakistan's elections.

The JI did well since 1977 and through the 1980s mainly due to Zia's policy of Islamisation. The Islamisation process begun under General Zia indicated an effort to adopt doctrinal values and practices popularised in Pakistan by Maududi. The JI was the only major party to contest the 1985 national elections (Baxter, Craig und et al., 1987).

However, after the referendum, the Jamaat's political fortunes plummeted. Since 1977 when General Zia-ul-Haq came to power, conservative Saudi influence grew considerably in Pakistan.

The JI of Maududi, an ally of the Saudis, became the ideological mentor of the new regime (Ali, Tariq,1983) In February 1985, elections to the National Assembly were held under the 1973 Constitution which had been partially retained. The elections were held on a non-party basis, but several candidates supported by General Zia-ul-Haq and his political ally, the JI were defeated (Ahmed, p.218) Maulana Tufail Muhammad, a former amir of the JI, and a number of other religious leaders did not endorse the Shariat Ordinance promulgated by President Zia in June 1988.

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal and JI

THE Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal has become some kind of a political enigma in Pakistan. It has been hunting with the hounds and running with the hare all these six years. Musharraf's military-led government which is playing the hound does not object to this politically oxymoronic role of the MMA because the arrangement helps it in keeping the people at large confused, the outside world guessing and the main political parties marginalised. And the mainstream political opposition seems too breathless from running for its life to view things in their correct perspective and sift fact from fiction.

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan (TLP)

The TLP, the political wing of far-right religious group Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan, founded by hardline Sunni Barelvi cleric Allama Khadim Rizvi (Late) in August 2015. TLP subscribes to Sunni Barelvi sect and the TLP sees itself as the guardian of Prophet Mohammed's honor and of Pakistan's blasphemy laws.

From Street Power to Electoral Force

The party made waves when it secured 8 per cent of total votes cast in the by-election for Lahore's National Assembly constituency in September 2017. Two months later, it made headlines after calling for the resignation of law minister Zahid Hamid, accusing him of blasphemously changing the wording of an oath taken by parliamentarians.

In the 2018 general elections, TLP fielded 744 candidates, gained a significant number of votes and won two seats in Sindh province. When Rizvi contested elections in 2018, it ate into former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's vote bank in Punjab.

“A newbie Right winger emerged as the fifth largest party. That this immensely helped the establishment's vicious campaign against Sharif goes without saying,” noted Tara Kartha, former director, National Security Council Secretariat. (Krishnankutty, 2021)

The TLP's performance is significant. The party was banned by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government on April 15 this year. Despite being designated a terrorist organization, it was allowed to contest the by-election. And it performed well.

While the PPP and PML-N candidates secured 15,656 and 14,747 votes respectively, the TLP came in third with 10,668 votes. Not only did the TLP manage to secure a significant number of votes in an election that saw a low turnout, but it also performed better than the ruling PTI. Its performance indicates the groundswell of sympathy and support it has been able to build up over a short span of time. (Ramachandran, 2021).

This is not the first time that the TLP contested elections. In 2018, although it failed to win any seats to the National Assembly, it managed to win two seats to the Sindh provincial assembly. It also did better than the PPP in the Punjab assembly elections.

Its strength lies in its street power. Not only have its demonstrations paralyzed daily life in Pakistan's cities but they have also been successful in forcing the government to concede to its demands. To end the TLP's blocking of the Islamabad-Rawalpindi highway in December 2017, for instance, the PML-N government conceded to the TLP's demands, even removing federal Law Minister Zahid Hamid. The PTI government too has repeatedly capitulated to the TLP's demands.

Since January 2021 the TLP, now under Saad Hussain Rizvi's leadership, began pressing the government to implement the agreement reached earlier. The government reached yet another agreement with the TLP, under which it said it would place the terms of the earlier deal before parliament. With the possibility of another protest looming, the government decided to arrest Rizvi and ban the TLP. In dealing with the TLP the PTI government has lurched from one extreme to another. On the one hand, it has appeased the TLP and done deals with it. On the other, it has banned the party.

7.6 Political strategies of BJP

The 1990's marked the emergence of a new and unprecedented development in Indian politics as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, assumed a position of national significance. Some political commentators have argued that the emergence of this party was the culmination of a sustained effort on the part of the BJP, Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsavak Sangh (RSS) to bring Hinduism into mainstream politics (Malik and Singh 1994).

While it is true that Hindu nationalism was a strong force nurtured by these groups prior to the 1990's, the entry of this force onto the Indian political scene heralded a new era in the history of Indian politics.

How and why did the BJP rise to prominence in the 1990's, finally winning a national election in 1998? Though the role of Hindu nationalist feeder organizations was important, this explanation does not account for the characteristics that made the 1990's unique. Specifically, the BJP's rise can be traced to the underlying fact that, during this period, there was a growing insecurity in the Hindu majority because changing conditions on the ground made it appear as if the nation was being controlled by the Muslim minority.

The BJP played on this perception and mobilized politically, asserting that the increasing power of the minority necessitated solidarity in India's Hindu population.

One of the techniques, which has been employed by the BJP, is the sentimentalisation of the national. It means using the brand of nation and the national for attaining party benefits. The theme of the nation and national has acquired extreme visibility. The death and the sacrifice of soldiers, proposals to place tanks in university campuses, and sedition charges on "anti-nationals," have all been used to promote a sense of patriotism that will be electorally beneficial. The sentimentalisation of the nation has also been used to generate support in favour of the policies and programmes that are being promoted by the government. This sentimentalisation is relied upon at every possible opportunity. The surgical strikes, for example, or demonetisation, all of these instances have been projected a possibility that could have been achieved only under the BJP government. The stronger this sentiment is the more electoral benefits it will reap.

Instead of working for a genuine federal polity, a specific type of national is promoted, while the local is robbed of its dignity, and labelled as narrow. Many local issues are avoided, while the national is constructed for the justification, and functioning of the majority government, and its ideological preferences.

Use of Policies as Symbolism

The BJP government after coming to power in May 2014 has launched a considerable number of policies that have been scrupulously named by keeping some electoral and ideological benefits in sight. Policies like the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, Skill India, Make in India, Start-up India, Stand-up India, for example, are some of the policies, the names of which carry a certain political value.

The policy names of the current government, on the other hand, rely on symbolisms that are intended to evoke nationalistic sentiments. This tradition of naming of policies is a well-thought-out stratagem. In public consciousness, it creates an illusion of a government working in national interest, rather than in local interest. This tendency of working symbolically also leads towards a centralisation of the polity. Amplification of the national government, and obscuring of the local, in turn, has two benefits to offer that are electoral and ideological. Ideologically, it helps in directing the psyche of the people in favour of the national government. In addition, this ideological benefit is convertible into electoral gains in favour of the party working at the centre.

Hindu's Indian Identity Politics

A primary part of the Hindu Right's reformulation of Indian identity was its rewriting of Indian history. The history that the Sangh Parivar told was a story in which India's Hindu population had been constantly suppressed and stifled by Muslim domination. Accordingly, BJP activists traced the peak of Indian civilization to the Gupta period prior to the 11th century. However, according to this story, Muslim conquests such as Mohammed of Ghazni's invasion of India in the 11th century brought this civilization down (Seshia 1998).

The subsequent Muslim conquests under the sultanate, and the growth of the Mughal Empire, thus, were depicted by the BJP and its allies as bloody struggles during which entire Hindu populations were victimized and massacred. The BJP campaign emphasized the fact that the Muslims were foreign invaders and had sacked and pillaged the Hindu population in the past. This led to the formation of a distinctly Hindu identity directed at preventing a similar Muslim invasion in

contemporary times, an invasion that took the form of the perceived threat that the Hindu population felt from the Muslim minority.

The Hindu Right's rewriting of Indian history was combined with targeted, symbolic mobilizations that cemented an Indian 'Hindu' identity. In general terms, the BJP's symbolic politics served to emphasize the perpetual conflict between Hindus and Muslims and demonstrate the increasing upper hand that the Muslims were gaining. The Ayodhya campaign (i.e., 'Ram Janmabhoomi') represented the ultimate instance of the BJP's symbolic politics. The effort to resurrect the temple at Ram's birthplace was an important means of demonstrating the threat posed to Hindus by Muslims and, in this way, consolidating India's Hindu identity (Malik and Singh, pp. 79-80).

Using the power of Digital Marketing

The 2014 elections saw for the first time a party campaigning and using the power of Digital Marketing to further their reach amongst the population of India. It felt like a breath of fresh air, and we could see the result in people buying into the dream of "Acche din Aayenge!".

In 2014 we saw the rise of Modi from a regional brand to a national one. With the help of advertising giants, campaigns were made across TV, Print, and Digital to create the father figure that a nation deserves.

To make him likable we were introduced to the struggles of Modi as a child serving tea, folklore of his youth and his work told in a way that we buy-in to the "unwavering all-knowing father figure" who would bring "Acche Din."(Good days).

This was done with resounding success with India getting a leader who connected across all ages - "Abki Baar Modi Sarkaar" was a brilliant master-stroke in Marketing.

National over Local

BJP tends to obscure the local in favour of the national, in order to curry favour with the majority at the national level. This tendency is termed as "centralisation" here. Political parties undertake this project employing numerous techniques. India provides a good example for understanding this centralised politics where political parties display such tendencies.

This strategy is characterised by relegating the local issues and leaders as secondary in importance. As an extension of this strategy, there is also a readiness to fill the top leadership posts with inexperienced, but ideologically promising people.

This entire strategy of election campaigns is underlined by a process of de-territorialisation of election campaigns at two levels. First, at the level of issues from the specific locale where election is being contested, and second, at the level of leadership, as an increasingly large number of leaders seem to be campaigning in constituencies that they do not belong to (Economic Times 2018).

Not surprisingly, the local issues were also pushed to a secondary position. In fact, the marginalisation of the local issues is somewhat automatic when local leaders are marginalised. In other words, the extreme successful run of the BJP and unavailability of any viable political party worth joining fore-excludes any meaningful opposition to such parachuting by the party. Thus, this de-territorialisation of election campaigns is a technique that reflects a tendency of a specific form of centralisation wherein issues and leaders—the two main aspect of any election—seem to have lost their rooting.

7.7 Jamaat-e-Islami and strategies

Elections are considered the main stage of electoral processing a modern democracy. The study of electoral politics has been described as ‘psephology’. Elections are complicated political process which is analysed based on political and social systems of a given state. Through electoral process the transfer of power shift from one set up to other (Akhtar, Awan, & Haq, 2010). In Pakistan, there are numbers of factors influence on voters during election. Pakistan is an Islamic country, majority of people are Muslims. However, the society is divided in different sects. Similarly Pakistani people belong to different ethnic groups and also have rural urban divisions.

Focus on winning elections as an objective

Another issue is a lack of real focus on winning elections as an objective. Jamaat’s organization has a heavy ideological and social agenda that consumes considerable human and financial resources. Other political parties make elections their sole focus. One solution currently on the table is the creation of an independent political wing, although under the same central emir. It appears this debate will surface more strongly after the 2018 general elections. Before then, Jamaat’s leadership will likely have to make some kind of decision on the issue. If and when this

decision is made, it would allow room for the now- marginalized but more capable cadre of affiliates to get involved in the party. Women and youth have been designated as priority areas in the Shura Council's 2015 plan for the following international fora. A more popular culture for youth has been adopted with a focus on sports. In addition, Jamaat's social media operation is one of the most proactive among political parties in Pakistan.

Political Islam

“Political Islam” is often used in a very broad sense, often lacking in nuance. The phrase is employed to include far more than just political groups or parties. Militant, terrorist, and social service relief organizations are also grouped under the term. Lumping them together can lead to serious misconceptions. It bothers us that Jamaat is being viewed through lenses of hostility and suspicion, in part because of an alleged association with extremist groups that are also considered “Islamists.” It bothers us because we don't form our perception of America by looking at the likes of the alt- right or white nationalists, even though such groups and individuals may enjoy significant public support. We will not be able to develop mutual trust if we base our relations on stereo-typing and assuming the worst. I firmly believe that cordial relations between mainstream Islamist movements and the West can and should be developed. As Graham Fuller, analyst and expert on Islamist movements, says:

Does Political Islam represent the last heroic stand of Muslim cultural resistance to galloping globalization with an American accent? Or does it represent the beginning of a new synthesis of Islam with con-temporaneity, enabling Muslim society and culture to move into the new millennium more confident of its own cultural foundations?

Democratic Culture in Pakistan

Jamaat's electoral failure is not a failure of Islamism in the democratic context. Its ability to enshrine Islam into Pakistan's Objective Resolution and into the country's constitution reveals as much and the fact that Jamaat still remains the standard bearer of Islamism in the country after 76 years illustrates that there is a place for political Islam in democracies. But Jamaat's electoral failure is not a political one either.

Jamaat-e-Islami understands that tangible political gains must be made with caution, and only when the established political framework allows for a political opening.

Before the JI could make its debut in Pakistani politics, General Ayub Khan brought a military coup in Pakistan. Khan was seen as a secular figure who intended to keep religion separate from politics (Jackson, 2011, 74). In order to make Pakistan into a modern state, he passed the Muslim family laws in 1961. These laws abolished unmitigated polygamy, gave powers to the women by making it compulsory for husbands to seek their wives consent for a second marriage, and abolished the practice whereby a husband could divorce his wife by saying talaq (divorce) three times (Jackson, 2011, 75). Seen as very progressive and in contrast to the traditional understanding of Islam, JI strongly opposed these laws and tried to put pressure on Khan to repeal them. General Khan did not give in to JI's demands but had to look to the leader of the party for support during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. He appealed to Mawdudi to declare the war against India a jihad in order to legitimize the Pakistani army's actions and to raise the morale of its soldiers (Jackson, 2011, 75). At the same time, JI decided to attain more political strength to protest liberal laws like the Muslim Family Laws.

The stage finally came for JI to test its political strength in 1970. Ayub's successor, Yahya Khan held general elections in 1970 in which the Jamaat took part (Jackson, 2011, 75). The JI had gone in with much hopes of capturing power to fulfill its dream of an Islamic state but was faced with an embarrassing election result winning only 4 out of the 300 seats in the national assembly (Kumar, 2001, 272). All Islamic parties together, the JI, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP), were only able to secure 13.95% of overall votes cast (Kumar, 2001, 272). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), won the elections. Bhutto, who had campaigned for the elections under the banner of socialism, was criticized by the religious parties as being anti-Islam while socialism was called a 'godless' system that was in opposition to the teachings of Islam (Jackson, 2011, 75).

It was only in the general elections of 2002 that the alliance of religious parties ended up with a considerable number of seats in the parliament (Tanwir, 2002, 252). The percentage of total votes cast for the religious parties increased from less than 2% to almost 11% winning them 46 seats in the national assembly. The religious alliance for the first time in Pakistan's history formed a majority government in the province of North-West Frontier (Tanwir, 2002, 252). The increased support for the religious parties was linked to the religious alliance's anti-American slogans that had been used to exploit people's emotions after American forces had entered the bordering territory of Afghanistan. However, as the most recent elections of 2008 have shown, the Pakistani

public has taken back the mandate from the religious alliance and elected a semi-secular party, Awami National Party (ANP), to form a government in North-West Frontier replacing the religious alliance (Goodson, 2008, 11). The religious alliance once again ended with a dismally low of 2% of total votes cast.

7.8 Modernity and extremism

By highlighting women's role in this party, Jamal distances herself from liberal feminists, who fail to account for women's mobilisation in fundamentalist groups. Drawing inspiration from the works of postcolonial feminists, she challenges the liberal assumption that women's agency can only be defined in terms of emancipation or resistance to patriarchal values.

She argues that agency can also be understood, for religiously-inclined women, in terms of self-transcendence and fulfilment of the 'divine will'.

Jamal uses this postcolonial feminist framework to move beyond the opposition between feminism and fundamentalism in order to analyse women's implication in the Jamaat's Islamisation project. In the first chapter, she introduces the reader to the discussions on Islamic and post-Islamic feminisms, which challenge the representation of Muslim women as passive victims of religion and culture. Locating herself in the continuity of these debates, she puts forward the notion of 'religious agency', highlighting the efforts of Jamaat women to transform themselves as well as to transform politics and society along religious lines.

Far from rejecting modernity, Jamaat women have appropriated the idea of modernity, delinking it from its 'Western' model, to subsume it instead within an Islamic framework. Jamal thus projects Jamaat women as the 'vanguard' of a 'new modernity', meant as an alternative to West-centric conceptions of modernity.

7.9 Personality rather than Policy

Are people, or more specifically the voting public, attracted to leaders or to their ideas? In the aftermath of Pakistan's tumultuous election season, the answer to the question is elusive. Democracy at international, national and provincial level faces the threats of authoritarian rule and

dominance of personality over institutions. The personality cult is dangerously deep-rooted in Pakistani Politics, which has also clearly flawed the political process.

It is precisely this reliance that could be blamed for the failure of Pakistan's political parties to develop solid organisational structures that can go beyond the cult of personality and become effective machinery that can translate charismatic leadership into meaningful change. This failure in turn has meant that once the life of a charismatic leader ends, or his memory fades, the parties created around them follow a similar downward trajectory into irrelevance. After the demise of memory or man, the country is left simply waiting and wanting the next heady mix of emotion and passion and tragedy, while denied the practical translation into something longer-lasting, less dramatic and more real than just the illusion of greatness.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, here as well, democracy and democratic institutions suffer from the dominance of authoritarian designs and urges. Ill-fatedly, the blame cannot be put only on non-democratic factors, even the democratic ones have not been able to support the democratic culture and socialization. Major political parties in Pakistan that should lead as torch-bearers of democracy are hijacked by authoritarian leadership and cult of personality. Personalities have been prioritized over the parties and the result is that personality-worship has guided the party members' and supporters' affiliation and loyalty to a direction that automatically leads the way to authoritarianism.

Another negative aspect of this has echoed out in the public through the noisy media in Pakistan: the political debates, discussions, promotions and criticisms are centered around personalities instead of parties. The attributes of personalities, their family background, and their personal relationships and habits have become the topics of debates among the politicians, political experts, party members, supporters and now the people as a whole. While the discussions on party structure, motto, vision and ideology have all been thrown to the backyard. Therefore, in such circumstances, expecting anything positive in relation to democratization of political environment is a fool's errand.

At the same time, major political parties in Pakistan, like Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf (PTI) and Pakistan People's Party (PPP), have not been able to reach to the common people through grass-root institutional development. Instead of reaching out to the people at the district and union council level, through consistent presence and performance, they

have only reached the people through selection of personalities from such levels for party tickets. True that such arrangements can provide an opportunity to the people to make their voices be heard through those personalities, but their voices don't turn into organized political demands, and the process does not inculcate in them the worth of democratic behaviour.

7.10 Corruption in Pakistani politics

Corruption in Pakistan is widespread, and extends to every sector from government to judiciary, police, health services and education. The problems are long-standing, and despite ongoing calls for reform, and many attempts to improve the situation, there is little evidence of progress.

According to Ismail and Rashid (2014), the levels of corruption in Pakistan are still high despite the law enforcement, judiciary civil servants, the business sector and other office bearers engaging themselves in corrupt activities. According to Transparency International (2017), corruption is rampant in Pakistan despite the presence of a legal framework established in 2002 to curb the vice. Transparency International further notes that government employees and people in the procurement and law enforcement engage in small scale corrupt activities that are difficult to counter.

The literature identifies a strong link between corruption and the history of the country, with some authors tracing corruption to the time when the country was established. Widespread corruption, therefore, continues existing despite governmental efforts to address it (Javaid 2010). Pakistan has for long dominated the list of the most corrupt countries around the world. The country, however, has seen significant improvements in the ranking for the past eight years. Nevertheless, the fight against corruption has been slowed by political instability in the country, which has weakened institutions charged with the responsibility of fighting corruption (Shahzad, Mithani, Al-Swidi and Fadzil 2012).

Corrupt activities by the law enforcement officers, government officials, and other key players continue to taint the image of the country. The following figure shows the corruption perception index of Pakistan by Transparency International. The data reveals that Pakistan is ranked number 117 as the least corrupt country out of a total of 175 countries, conferring to the CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) conducted by the by (TI) (Transparency International 2018).

7.12 Conclusion

The JI has not only failed to achieve its objective but also moved away from it while trying to make compromises to achieve political success. With a huge Muslim population, Pakistan remains a country where religion is very important. However, while people would like to see god-fearing politicians, they would not like religion to be the basis for all the political decisions. For parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami, it is better to act as pressure groups, keeping a check on government's policies by voicing concern where the policies are found to be in contrast with Islamic teachings.

People consider Jamaat-e-Islami(JI) more of a religious party than a political party. Despite being one of the most democratic party, JI has never got majority in elections. People in Pakistan still vote on the basis of sect, language, cast etc.

JI gets most of the votes from the "Ahle-e-Hadith" sect. The remaining sects would never vote for them rather they would vote someone from their sect or any political party like PMLN and PTI etc. On the other hand, JI had took U-Turns in the past (they still do it). Firstly, they supported Musharraf then they went against him.

Jamaat's electoral failure is not a failure of Islamism in the democratic context. Its ability to enshrine Islam into Pakistan's Objective Resolution and into the country's constitution reveals as much and the fact that Jamaat still remains the standard bearer of Islamism in the country after 76 years illustrates that there is a place for political Islam in democracies. But Jamaat's electoral failure is not a political one either.

Jamaat-e-Islami understands that tangible political gains must be made with caution, and only when the established political framework allows for a political opening.

If it does not abide by this governing precedent, by the sheer fact that Jamaat-e-Islami represents Islamic politics in a country in which nearly 90 percent self-identify as Muslims, it represents a threat to the establishment. That is a standard for measuring political power, and by this standard, Jamaat-e-Islami remains a powerful political force in Pakistan — one that simply happens to be devoid of many electoral victories.

While the rise of the BJP to political dominance is the result of multiple factors that are external and internal to the party. The decay and decline of the once-dominant Congress and regional parties and the failure of the non-Congress non-BJP parties to forge stable governments are the external

ones. BJP's innovative political strategy to adapt itself to the changing times and the popularity of Narendra Modi are the internal ones. In the last five years, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has undergone a massive transformation and is today the country's most formidable political force. The party won the 2014 general election with a convincing majority under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi who assumed power in May 2014. It is in power in 20 states, either on its own or with its allies. This rise can be attributed to various factors, including the party leadership, organisational skills, and effective ground work.

Chapter 8 Results

All findings of the research will be presented and conclusions drawn in the thesis' final section. This chapter will conclude all results derived from all the data, survey and information of previous chapters. Analyzing NCIPM based on empirical data, results of interviews, results of empirical studies, determining Madaudi's stance, comparing BJP and JI, etc. is one example.

A comparison has been made between JI and the Hindu national party BJP (Bharati Janta Party) with its political, cultural, economic, and social dynamics. Using Elsenhans (NCIPM) New Cultural Identitarian and Political Movements as the theoretical construct, this chapter analyzes the theories and ideologies of political ideology and agenda within the theoretical construct. Accordingly, NCIPM was the subject of a field study. Among the new forms of political movements, the JI is regarded as one of the key ones as New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPMs).

In this study, JI is analyzed through the lens of NCIPM, and it is argued that JI has emerged globally, regionally, and locally as a new political force. It is a political party based on religious and cultural values, whose political activities reflect these values. In order to assess it only in terms of its political affiliation, it is more logical to view it as part of a cultural and religious group. Since Bahartiya Janta Party (BJP), is also a nationalist Hindu political party in India, JI will be compared with it? The NCIPM classifies BJP as representing state and ethnic identity. In addition to analyzing the socio-political conditions that led to the emergence of American-style cultural identity movement (NCIPM), this research will examine the popularity of Jihad in Pakistan as well as the India-style BJP.

Jamat-e-Islami was discussed in this chapter as a new emerging political-cultural force (NCIPM) as opposed to the Indian Party BJP (Bahartia Janta Party). Information on the Jamat-e-Islami in this chapter I explained Dr. Elsenhans' understanding of new cultural and political movements (NCIPM) as well as the theories that underlie the thesis. My study concerning NCIPM is accordingly presented in this regard.

Taking into account historical and global contexts, NCIPM is a theory suggesting JI is a new political power. A political party cannot be presented exclusively as a cultural or religious party due to its political activities.

Furthermore, the movement of both NCIPMs has been analysed based on eight variables that will be discussed in chapter 2. NCIPM will be the subject of the first chapter. As well as elaborating on these points, I will also point out the characteristics of the NCIPM, such as cultural identity, values, and economic policies as well as its national and international political system. In this chapter, we will also consider city classes and rent. This report will refer to Matrix and Prof. Dr. Elsenhans research papers in order to examine and analyze these elements and factors. This report will refer to Matrix and Prof. Dr. Elsenhans research papers in order to examine and analyze these elements and factors.

Hartmut Elsenhans developed this theoretical framework in the mid-1990s, arguing that the changing political and economic conditions at the global and local levels have led to the decline of the secular elites. As he continues, we are heading toward a world of diverse cultural identities embedded by powerful powers that believe in defending their sovereignty, but do not clash, as they are implicated and involved in preserving a multipolar world.

Elsenhans argues that social movements have evolved into what he terms 'network' social movements by examining their origins and how they interact in modern society. Unlike in the past, movement membership is no longer the definer; their leaders want to bring their people into harmony in a middle-class direction.

Based on a comparative and intercultural theoretical approach, Sebastian Schwecke evaluated this theory in Asia and Africa. With reference to cultural identity, he explains how political movements are revitalized and moderated in developing societies. His New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) incorporate Hindu nationalists as well as many Islamic political movements. Rent management is essentially the same challenge faced by both old bureaucracies and new cultural identitarian movements. The NCIPM has also been focused on by Prof. Rachid Ouaisa and, in this regard, argues that "These movements are a response to the failure of the postcolonial, secularist models."

In part, the JI preoccupation with the state stems from a time when the concept of the state dominated the political imagination on the global stage. JI's mobilization strategies have evolved

in step with the change in public perception of the state in the twentieth century. Interestingly, this link with the international community is understudied and overused simultaneously in Pakistan.

A wide range of analyses of Pakistani politics, particularly Islamism, are almost never conducted without reference to an international political order, and correspondingly, the nature of specific developments inside Pakistan is rarely analyzed by connecting them to an international political imaginary. Political parties can use cultural identity to gain support from different classes and even from those outside of the system in a class-transcending way, even though it has no direct connection with rent or profit. Cultural national identity transcending class is exemplified by Secularism.

Throughout its existence in the mainstream established political system, JI as NCIPM has gained considerable political power both locally and nationally. A cultural and religious organization called Jamaa-e-Islami, now known as NCIPM, emerged as a political party based on identity. During the political and electoral process, the JI took part in political and electoral politics as well as fighting for the implementation of Islamic law.

The study analyses JI as NCIPM according to the ideology of the Maududi because JI is a revolutionary party whose founders founded a revolutionary party and not a conventional party struggling to assert its power or forming a government in name of Islam. Because JI called for a change in a corrupt and secular system, it appealed to the masses and the educated classes. A key principle of Maududi's ideology was to emphasize the Islamic identity and create a new political setting which led to the party's growth.

By prevailing standards, Jamaat is the most disciplined and internally most democratic party of Pakistan, founded in 1941 in Pathankot, at a convention of supporters of Maududi, who chaired the session, and its declared purpose, adopted by consciences', in brief, as later enshrined in its constitution in 1957, was to work for the establishment of Islamic way of life through constitutional and democratic means. Initially it was not an electoral party, in that contesting election was not part of its purpose, but this was changed in 1957. (Niazi, 2002, 24)

Its base is primarily composed of low and middle-class members. Others may also join the NCIPM due to their disappointment with other mainstream parties. Three important elements contributed to the emergence of JI: individuals from different social strata and varying views on how it should be governed.

Taking advantage of the theoretical concept of Prof. Elsenhans, chapter 2 analyzed and measured the phenomenon of NCIPMs (New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements). By analyzing the variables, Sabastian enables us to comprehend the reason of emergence and evolution of JI. In the variables, we have seen what factors and elements influence the tendencies and formation of JI.

It is considered essential to these movements to adhere to their own culture, which differs from others. The context of this theory is a view of politics in many developing countries that is inspired by a view of the (at least partial) rent-based economy and the possibility of a transition to capitalist production. To better understand the evolution of the Pakistani Taliban, we will examine how proposed variables affects the development of JI.

Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) refer to new political movements based on culturally based identity definitions that are emerging all over the globe. The middle and lower middle classes have historically supported culturally based and traditionally based movements. As an example, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, Bartiya Janta Party (BJP) in India, Islamic Justice Party in Turkey and Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan have strengthened their support bases in many countries. Additionally, we have discussed different factors that contribute to these movements' popularity and their emergence as significant political powers, especially in countries that were colonized previously. It is not just economics that motivates these cultural identitarian movements, but instead they are based on cultural values and religious identity.

The concept of NCIPM and the theory of "Rent" are explained in detail in this chapter. Furthermore, I have described in this chapter how variables about NCIPM affected the empirical research. This was accomplished using interview methods from Pakistani citizens. A text and a table were used to collect the data.

For this purpose, we have used Prof. Dr. Elsenhans' theories as a basis for acquiring the results of the surveys. Dr. Sebatian Schwecke proposed eight variables in his thesis to test the NCIPM. As a result of much reflection and deliberation on these variables, I have deemed it extremely important for Dr. Sabastian to refer to these variables. Professor Helsenhans' research projects provided the outline for the theoretical framework. The details of every variable in the NCIPM have been explained finally. Also included in this chapter are results of surveys as well as empirical data derived from these surveys.

Researchers will investigate factors leading to the rise of New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM), focusing especially on the popularity and emergence of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan and how JI used cultural identity to advance its anti-secular values campaign. The analysis have focused on the current middle class of Pakistan and the party's political base as well as its roots in its political base. Founded as an association of religious-minded scholars and professionals, JI grew into an organization of scholars and professionals. These three institutions represent a major ideologic trend in modern interpretations of Islam, apart from the religious scholars. The Bahartiya Janta Party (BJP) is being considered as a NCIPM in India by Sebastian Schwecke in his thesis "New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements."

The analysis of variables allows us to know what gave rise to these parties and how they have evolved. We have demonstrated in the variables what affects the formation of this political party and the tendencies of the parties. The data collection was based on interviews conducted in a variety of fields other than JI's members and leaders, which helped me to discern what people feel about the party's popularity. For each variable, relevant respondents have been contacted. For example, interviews were contacted from the circles of bureaucracy since that department deals with protests and activity of both the party and other parties. We also contacted medical, legal and academic experts. To get the up-close and personal analysis of why the middle and lower classes are attracted to the JI, I also included people from the middle and lower classes.

NCIPM is dominated by middle- or lower-class members, yet they have support from various social classes. NCIPM's rise as a political alternative in some parts of the world can be explained by the lack of ownership provided by dominant secular political parties as anti-imperialism forces due to the political politics of rent distribution rather than efforts to provide reasonable rents. The NCIPM will try to play an active role in the political system when rent is reduced, which has a higher chance if the production of rent is not due to the sale of natural resources in international markets, but due to indirect occupation of the economy.

NCIPM will have a tendency toward moderation when facing a surplus amount of rent, whether it is derived from natural resources or indirectly from the economy, whilst attempting to be taken under ownership by ruling state classes. In the absence of popular support for NCIPM, the desire to retain permanent ownership diminishes.

Based on Prof. Elsenhans' theory, the JI has been categorized as New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPMs) and variables have been evaluated in order to describe the phenomenon. Additionally, the Sabastian study helped explain the reasons for the emergence and evolution of JI through the analysis of the variables. The variables that have been analyzed have shown how factors and elements influence the tendencies and formation of JI.

According to NCIPM, social classes hold a lot of power. The NCIPM supports liberal policies in the interest of these classes which results in the lowering of rent. Lower middle class people are unable to enter the political system when rent is reduced. State classes control how rent is distributed. The lower class has no interest in accessing this structure. Thus, the lower classes gain no benefits from joining such a system. By utilizing the variables outlined in Sabastian's model on BJP in India, the theoretical framework has been explored. According to these variables, JI as a religious political party was analyzed in line with Elsenhans Variables, and all of these variables were weighed and discussed accordingly.

By analyzing the variables in Sabastian's model of variables, we can show the theoretical framework regarding BJP in India. These variables have been used to analyze the JI's conservative-political appeal in light of the theory of Elsenhans Variables.

Chapter 3 presented the concepts and variables related to the birth and evolution of the Jamat-e-Islami party in the form of NCIPM as given by Maulana Mududi, the founding father of Jamat-e-Islami. The chapter then concludes with an explanation of how the Jamat-e-Islami came to be an entity that emerged based on culture and religion. This begins with a discussion of the specific ideology of Maulana Mududi.

Besides being a revolutionary ideology and religion, he thinks that Islam pushes for the betterment of the collective world system or order. The goal was to fulfill this purpose by initiating the "Survival of Islam" movement. Also, the concepts of Maulana Muadudi will be incorporated into further explanations of Islamic revolutions, Islamic political systems, democratic ways of Islam, and democratic concepts in Islam. In Mududi's view, the people have taken Islam upon themselves as only a religious ideology; rather, Islam is a revolutionary ideology that encompasses all walks of life. Later in this chapter, I will describe the significance and purpose of Jammat-e-Islami's foundation. Also presented at the end of chapter two is the philosophical underpinnings of JI. In

addition, the movement of JI was analyzed, emphasizing that it was politically or culturally motivated.

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan is distinct among contemporary Islamic movements in that it had strong democratic traditions right from its inception in 1941; has a written constitution to govern its organization; and has always operated within the framework of the country's constitution. It seeks to bring about societal transformation is through appealing to the intellect, organizing communities, and rallying masses around its program—just like any other political party in the East or West. It believes that Islam provides a universal and dynamic vision of life that is valid and relevant for human welfare in all times and places (Gillani, 2011).

Maududi's political theories, ideas, and concepts have been discussed in-depth in this chapter. His concept of Islamic state has also been discussed extensively. Maududi's view of democratic, secular, socialist, and capitalist western ideologies are also important to examine. Furthermore, two nation theory and composite nationalism are discussed. The last section of the book considers his achievements in framing the Islamic constitution and founding Jamaat-e-Islami, a religious-political party. (Maudoudi, 2008)

According to Maududi, religion and politics are inseparable. Thus we can't fulfill religious dictates until we put in place a political system aligned to the religion's criteria. Some people believe that Maududi's idea of an Islamic state holds us to our religious duty to struggle for one, as if it were a religious obligation to pray regularly. It is based on the fact that Maududi's ideology continues to have a widespread following around the world that he was chosen for analysis. (Usman, Ashar 2004.)

In order to actualize his dream of establishing an Islamic state, he founded the Jamaat-i-Islami (hereinafter known as JI), which is one of the most organized state-sponsored religious parties in Pakistan. In the JI's standard discourse, Maududi helped establish the ideology that is regarded as the norm. Maududi's political theory is also worth investigating because debates on constitutionalism are frequently raised in countries with majority Muslim populations.

In this context, there are issues related to the sovereignty of human beings vs. the sovereignty of God, the state's responsibilities toward non-Muslim citizens, and the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens when it comes to their fundamental rights. Maududi's political theory is

also worth investigating because debates on constitutionalism are frequently raised in countries with majority Muslim populations.

In particular, they examine the relationship between human beings' sovereignty and divinity's sovereignty, the State's responsibilities to non-Muslim citizens, and the differences between the fundamental rights of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. Maududi's political theory assumes the inseparability of politics and religion, and understanding this link will facilitate understanding Jammāt-e-Islami as New Cultural Identitarian Political Movement based on Maududi's philosophy.

He even has the credit of making the idea of an Islamic political party widely acceptable, with his writings defining the parameters of the country's religio-political debate. Many have credited Maududi with helping to make Islam's political parties, including the Muslim League, popular across different parts of the country.

According to the preceding dialogue, what is construed in the political theory of Maududi as divine may involve some divinity, but is ultimately shaped by the interpreter's social and political context, and his own subjectivity, which cannot be regarded as divine. Within the framework of Islamic constitutionalism, establishing an Islamic state has always been a significant issue.

In one of the most widely read works he has written extensively about the responsibility Muslims have when establishing an Islamic state. Maududi was one of the most vocal and eloquent ideologues of the 20th century. According to Maududi, his main theses are fundamentally rooted in the divine, which include the inseparability of religion and politics and the indivisibility of God's sovereignty. As a result of Maududi's ideology, the party's membership increased due to its emphasis on cultural identity and a new political set-up. His environment had a profound effect on him when it came to reviving ideas of going back to the past. Khilafa may have arisen from his connection with the past.

His idea of a state is not practical; it would be a democracy with a public and parliamentary aspect. Probably the best thing about his idea is that he does not limit it to states but rather works to expose Muslim culture and Islamic societies for their idiotic and idolatrous practices.

Furthermore, Maududi relies on moral trainings while considering pacifist and Islamic societies as being the same group since they share similar behaviors irrespective of their religion.

Another point worth mentioning is the anti-western tradition of dominance. Mawdudi considers criticizing the West culture and civilization to be a lifelong mission, while employing the same political model and methodology used in the West for working toward the reformation of religious societies; a tradition, which has been followed by other Islamic thinkers.

Organization of the party

All democratic parties make rules and regulations for the smooth functioning of its affairs and make the organization strong and effective and bring coherence and unanimity in the folds of the party. It fixes the power and functions, rights and duties, and responsibilities of all the office bearers and members. “In Pakistan, submission to the party rules and regulations remain personal and individual matter of a member or official of a party, and are generally not implemented to avoid differences and tension in the ranks of party, (Gillani, 2011, 368- 369) which puts a question mark on the democratic credence of a party and makes it puppet in the hands of few influential people for the attainment of their personal benefits and interests. According to Irshad Ahmad Arif “they come together for their mutual interests not ideals and objectives” (Arif, 30 December, 2017, 92 News Islamabad), therefore have a shallow vision, democratic façade, minimal responsibility and less care for public welfare.

On the other hand, “Jamaat has associated, its organization, with religious spirit. The observance of the party constitution, which intricately specify 5 the rules and regulations for the members, is considered as a religious duty, consequently bringing more coherence and adhesiveness to its structure” (Gillani, 2011, 369) and makes the party conspicuous among the multitude of political parties in the political system of Pakistan.

In this chapter 4, the concept of nationalism was discussed as either Muslim nationalism or Hindu nationalism and specifically Maududi's concept. This paper will look at why Maududi opposed Muslim nationalism in India and argued for the unity of Muslims as a whole. The concept of a world order opposing contemporary world order is whereas the concept of a global system featuring Islam is presented, raising the issue of whether it could become globalized Islamic nationalism like other nationalisms such as Hindi, Western, and Arabic. It is the concept of nationalism which has long been contested within Muslim land. Within the framework of Jamaat-e-Islami's ideological viewpoint, Maududi's concept of nationalism is discussed.

In comparison with Jamaat-e-Islami as NCIPM in Pakistan, Hindu nationalism also played a key role for the success of BJP with respect to its political role in India and to what extent it played a pivotal role in its success. As defined by the dictionary,

Nationalism is "the belief that each nation belongs to its own people". Country has the right and obligation to come into being as a state." Considered a nationalist ideology, this has been one of the most powerful ideologies in the world for centuries. Ideologies are among the oldest and most virulent forms of knowledge available.

The nationalist movement is one of the most visible forces in politics. It is a matter of identity and civic action, both of which are deeply intertwined in the 19th century. Citizens of a nation are generally thought of as those who conform to its values and set of civic rights and laws and pledging to abide by those laws.

There is an element of civics and ethnicity to every nationalism, varying in degree and form according to Smith (1991). Civic or territorial components may be dominant; ethnic or vernacular elements may be dominant other times. Rourke and Boyer define nationalism as having some characteristics, one of which is establishing values about what is good and bad. In the western world, nationalism penetrates and spreads in such a way that it shatters unity and integrity of the Muslim ummah.

In Maududi's eyes, nationalism was an antithesis to monotheism, and a Western concept that divided the Muslim world and increased the dominance of the West. According to Maududi, nationalism rests on the right of sovereignty, thus political power is derived from the will of the people. By doing so, the nations were saved from the power of tyrants in middle Ages politics. As part of this discussion, some of the best scholars will also contribute their opinions. In Maududi's political writings, he criticized both the Muslim nationalism of the League, and the all-encompassing nationalism of the Jami'atul-Ulama-i Hind and the Congress Party (Gillani, 2011, p.79-84).

Maududi opposed Muslim Nationalism and the two-nation theory in United India at the early stage of the movement for Independent Pakistan because he thought it would be fatal to the unity of the Muslims and the strength of the Muslims would be divided. As a cliché, Pan-Islamism is now a symbol of the prevailing politics of Pakistan and JI cannot claim mass support based on such a slogan. Identities play a big part in nationalist movements, as they do in political movements. A

variety of national identities including liberal, civic, ethnic, and cultural nationalism can be grouped together as one of the most vibrant political dynamics of the 19th century. A political movement with a rich history in the 19th century, nationalism can be described in various ways, including liberal, civic, ethnic or cultural, since the definition differs between nations (Gillani, 2011, p.90).

Nationalists are generally viewed as one of the more modern movements even though civilization has always organized around a shared identity. Since there is a large Muslim minority in India, BJP's political success and electoral success is mainly based on Hindu nationalism. Hindu nationalism is deeply rooted in the low and middle class segments of society, and BJP's major support comes from these sections. As a symbol of Hindu nationalism, BJP has effectively created fear among Muslims in India by inciting the fear factor of division between Pakistan and the United India and stimulating the collective memory of the nation. Despite the fact that JI has emerged as a political party based on Islamic and cultural identity, the party is struggling with the electorate due to the current political conditions.

Taking into account ethnic politics and non-political actors will have to be the major obstacles dealt with by JI. Despite claiming to be an Islamic state and winning over a large number of people, the JI was unable to turn this support into electoral success.

Because there are several factors and elements involved in the election process, JI cannot gain power in parliament on the basis of the concept of Islamic nation or Islamic state. There are many factors that influence Jamaat-e-Islami's ability to co-opt, counter, or coerce it and its agenda, including JI's interactions with domestic and foreign actors such as the army, elected officials, and other political parties.

The role of JI as an emerging national party and its role as NCIPM was examined in the chapter 5. A review of the election data presented by JI will be presented along with a comparison of the success and failure rates of JI in the elections. Research was conducted on secondary sources that provide reviews and analyses of Pakistani electoral politics. The information was gathered from secondary sources which discussed and evaluated electoral politics in Pakistan. JI's electoral strategies are analyzed using a content analysis method.

This chapter discusses this fairly surprising finding. The article points out that Jamaat-e-Islami's failure to win elections in Pakistan can be explained by the state's co-optation of its platform, its incapacity to address the salient parts of ethnic identity in Pakistan, and its elitist ideology. As a social movement, Jamaat-Islami (JI) gained influence in Pakistan to help form the Islamic constitution. They later entered the electoral politics and became politicians. It was Maududi's idea that started the JI. Eventually, disagreements developed regarding the party's objectives and vision.

The aims and goals of JI were put at odds with compromises it had to make as a political party. Also discussed will be why the JI, unlike the political party of India BJP (The Bharatiya Janata Party), has not been able to convert its popularity into electoral success and maintain its mass mobilization campaigns for a sustained period of time under an Islamic banner.

JI espouses an Islamic welfare state where basic needs like food, clothing, housing, health, education and justice is accessible to all and where people can vote the governments in and out of power (Usman, Ashar 2004. P.677). It is not a major party regarding the electoral success, but it is essentially an important party. This party is not political in the sense, as the meaning is taken of the ordinary democratic parties.

It is an ideological party. Jamaat-i-Islami has a specific ideology. A heartily attachment to its ideology and determination and endure to spend one's life for it, is the first condition of or relation with it. By prevailing standards, Jamaat is the most disciplined and internally most democratic party of Pakistan, founded in 1941 in Pathankot, at a convention of supporters of Maududi, who chaired the session, and its declared purpose, adopted by consciences', in brief, as later enshrined in its constitution in 1957, was to work for the establishment of Islamic way of life through constitutional and democratic means. Initially it was not an electoral party, in that contesting election was not part of its purpose, but this was changed in 1957 (Usman, Ashar 2004. P.340).

The Jammat strongly supports legislation with Islamic elements, such as the Hudood Ordinance or Blasphemy law and would resist any effort to amend them. Jammat has been consistently critical of the 'war on terror' and the military action in Tribal Areas. It favours negotiations with the Taliban. It is also critical of the alliance with the US, which it regards akin to slavery.

It derives its ideas from the thoughts of Maududi and is both a political party and a revivalist movement. In addition to restructuring society and politics as well as establishing an Islamic-based state to replace the secular state, the party has been fighting for the establishment of these rightful

principles. In the course of its development, the JI was perhaps the first of its kind to develop systematically an Islamic ideology, a modern revolutionary interpretation of Islam, and an agenda for social action. According to JI, Theo-Democracy meant shaping government according to Islamic teachings through democratic processes.

Despite playing a vital role in important political events that have shaped Pakistan's history, JI has been unable to control the central power of the state since 1947. Both during the 1956 and 1973 constitution debates, the party played a crucial role. The 1973 constitution was influenced by Islamic principles. A modern democracy's electoral process is primarily centered around elections. It has been called 'psephology' to study electoral politics. The process of elections is a complex one based on the state's social and political system. There are many factors that go into the analysis of elections, such as the political system and the social system of a particular country.

Accordingly, JI's strategy involves gradual change, with its four point programme designed to transform society from a secular one to an Islamic one. The first part of the programme looks at intellectualism, virtue, social reform, and vision of leadership that's just. It is the very core of the JI programme to create what it calls an "intellectual revolution."

Despite polarizing Islam in Pakistan, the JI failed to gain any benefits from it. However, the percentage of religious votes cast has not increased with the increase in size of the vote. Despite its effectiveness as a political force, the JI was unable to prevent other individuals from exploiting religion in this way. Both Pakistan and the Jamaat are changing. It is only a matter of time before the political fortunes of the party improve. If it desires to succeed in the political process, particularly in a democracy, then it must adapt to changes that reveal its original ideology will be minimized if such a party is to remain credible (Usman, Ashar 2004. P.342).

By comparing the Jamat-e-Islami movement in Pakistan with the Bhartiya Janata Party in India, according to NCIPM, the chapter 6 discussed how the two movements share and differ. Fundamentally, these two parties are comparable because they both fall into the same NCIPM category, and the ideological basis of their political structures is fundamentalism, culture, or religion.

The purpose of this study was primarily to show how they both fall under the category of NCIPM regardless of their differing ideologies. Here are some comparisons and recommendations that may aid in understanding the differences between the two.

As BJP and JI share a dominant social support base of middle class, but the political and socioeconomic landscape is considerably different, the paper will also discuss their similarities and differences. Accordingly, it discusses the contrasting trajectory of democratic consolidation based on ethnic and religious nationalism. Both movements grew up in somewhat similar circumstances, although the main difference is that BJP did so in a more democratic environment while JI did not have the same opportunities.

Furthermore, BJP tries to win the support of Hindus in the name of Hindu Nationalism while JI is an ideological movement that focuses on Islamic teachings as law of the land. The theory of social movement (SMT) was applied to JI because it first began as a social movement and then transformed into a pressure group and eventually a political party and it continues to be considered as a social movement generation after generation.

JI's performance as NCIPM was also measured using Social Movement theory. BJP and Jamaat-e-Islami come from different countries but share some of the same political, economic, and social circumstances. However, either at the local level or in the national arena, the fate of these two movements is different, since BJP grew in a more democratic environment, while JI did not find a democratic or political environment conducive to growth.

Although BJP as opposed to JI is the most important NCIPM in India, it emerged as one of the other forces of social stratification that are shifting towards private employment, an amalgam of middle and lower middle classes forming a new middle class that is distinct from earlier middle classes. BJP is emerging as the NCIP with greater speed compared with JI for several reasons, one of which is that Pakistan's democratic institutions have historically been weak and unstable, particularly in comparison with those of India.

The NCIPM has not been able to develop fully because of the lack of democracy in Pakistan so far. There are also deeper roots of feudalism in Pakistani society in specific areas and the key institutions and constituencies of the country are controlled by influential families and castes, and many votes are cast on the basis of caste.

Throughout Pakistan's recent history, every democratic and military government has used religion for its own gain. Jihad was hence used among the masses to legitimize each state's action and gain

support for it. Developing a strong understanding comes from giving these voices the opportunity to be heard by a democratic government. A Muslim state in Pakistan is either impossible, unnecessary, or alien to Pakistani society. That is the message the JI's electoral defeat communicates. Political Islamization and the politicization of religion will only lead to the abuse of religion for political ends.

In spite of emerging power and an organized structure, both were measured by applying social movement theory. Using cross-cultural comparisons can benefit studies on Islamist and Hindu nationalist movements, as well as movements for cultural identity in developing societies. Although neither factors can be separated for quite some time, it might at least be assumed that the growth of middle class segments as well as the rise and moderation of NCIPM are interrelated in a number of developing countries.

Both parties stand for culturally-declared identities that are in opposition to secularism. 'Fundamentalism' is the foundation of both these political parties' research that focuses on cultural identity. Although fundamentalists often apostasize, their apostasy is under the influence of secularism in spite of their socioeconomic agenda.

Islam influences JI while BJP is bred from Hinduism. In Hinduism, public rights are not achieved through power. Islam teaches that political power can be used as a means of achieving public rights, contrary to Hinduism. Dedicated to the protection of minorities and their needs, it also defines their rights and guarantees their rights. Understanding the difference between these two ideologies on NCIPM parameters requires considering the ideological point of view.

As exemplary models for the development of New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements, Jammāt-e-Islami (JI) and the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) are examined. The process by which previously divisive and radical political parties can emerge as increasingly moderate, centre-right parties in an increasingly stable, path-dependent fashion. In societies where NCIPM play a significant role, this development is feasible with factors of political economy: rent scarcity and development policies perhaps somewhat successful enough to enable middle-class segments to move away from rent allocation processes once they become challenged in significant ways by rising social classes.

Using contemporary circumstances, we try to examine whether Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) can take on the role of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India. It examined why JI has not played such a significant role as BJP has in India. Here, rent and city classes play a crucial role. Moreover, secular parties and groups, as well as secular parties are a big hurdle in the way of JI, which raises certain questions. As far as political, economic, and social circumstances go, Jamaat-e-Islami from Pakistan and BJP from India share some similarities.

In terms of power politics, however, their paths diverged because BJP benefited from a more democratic environment, while JI did not. Both of these parties fit into the NCIPM category, which is the reason for comparison. In addition, Pakistan's democratic institutions have always been unstable and weaker than those of India. Thus, Pakistan has not had a fully mature democracy and this has been the primary impediment to the advancement of NCIPM so far.

In addition, feudalism is deeply ingrained in Pakistani society in some areas, feudals and the influential control the main constituencies and institutions of the country. In these areas, voters cannot exercise their freedom of choice, and votes are cast on the basis of caste and sect.

The reason for such occurrences will be discussed. Pakistani politics have been dominated by the Army for many years. The reason for such occurrences will be discussed. Pakistani politics have been dominated by the Army for many years. This is what I will discuss and try to determine why JI hasn't played the same role as BJP has in India, if there is the same environment available for JI to do the same? The Justice Initiative can be defended by pointing out that almost every democratic or military government in Pakistan has used religion to advance its own interests.

War was always referred to as jihad to garner public support and legitimize the state's actions. Due to the closed political structures of Pakistani politics, JI could not establish roots at the national level. Pakistan consists either of the Pakistan People's Party or the Pakistan Muslim League when martial law is not in effect. Feudal or business tycoon parties run candidates in these elections. They buy or force votes. The candidates of JI, on the other hand, are mostly middle class and rely solely on Islam's message to influence voters.

In the 2002 elections, it won five national assembly seats and seven seats in the Sindh Assembly as part of the MMA platform. That was arguably its peak in electoral politics. But as time progressed, the JI's support base eroded because of a variety of factors.

However, JI's poor performance in the elections was not only due to some policies it pursued, but also to factors outside its control. JI was initially established to share Mawdudi's ideas. There were later disagreements about the party's goals and philosophy. In order for the party to succeed, JI had to make certain compromises which did not coincide with its ideological stance. Fatima Jinnah, for example, was supported by the JI for her presidential campaign against Ayub Khan in 1965, even though it went against Mawdudi's views on women's roles. Furthermore, JI demonstrated its willingness to work with authoritarian regimes by siding with General Zia after Bhutto's regime fell. Other opposition parties became hostile to the JI as a result.

There is no inbuilt security system for the government and the public, and we rely on a faulty system to handle day to day affairs. In the United States, there is no check on the role of law, and the rule of law is the legislation that is most violated by most segments of society. We are left behind many nations because of our sense of insecurity. Due to the lack of understanding of how democracy works, Pakistani politics could not develop better. As we change it and tailor it to suit our own interests, we have ignored the national interest.

Pakistan's politics resemble a business more than politics themselves. In politics, we only do what is advantageous to us, not what is beneficial to the public or to the common man. After coming to power, political governments collapsed due to internal political rifts within political parties and military interventions by politicians to bring down parliamentary governments.

What aspects of leaders or their ideas attract people, specifically the electorate? It is hard to find an answer to this question following Pakistan's tumultuous election season. Authoritarian rule and personality dominance threaten democracy at the international, national, and provincial levels. Pakistani Politics is deeply rooted in the personality cult, which has also clearly hampered the political process. Exactly this reliance may have contributed to Pakistani political parties' failure to create solid organizations that could transcend the cult of personalities and become effective machines capable of transferring charismatic leadership into meaningful change.

As a result of this failure, the parties created around charismatic leaders of the past are equally destined for irrelevance once their lives end or their memory fades. Memory and man are gone and the country is left waiting and wanting the next heady mix of emotion, passion, and tragedy, but without the practical meaning of something that would last longer, be less dramatic, and be more real than an illusion of greatness.

The Pakistani government also suffers from the exploitation of democratic institutions and the dominance of authoritarian tendencies. Unfortunately, the blame cannot be placed on solely non-democratic factors; even democratic factors were unable to promote democratic culture and socialization. Pakistan's major political parties are hijacked by authoritarian leadership and personality cults while supposed to serve as torchbearers of democracy. As a result of this prioritization of individuals over parties, the party members and supporters have become increasingly loyal to and affiliated with authorities that automatically lead to authoritarianism.

Participation into the electoral process throughout the history has remained insignificant the embracement of democracy as the right mode of rule has never got public acceptance. Politicians have an image of corrupt and dishonest breed of leadership. Democratic values and norms have been undermined to the large extent. Democracy has been considered merely as the procedural system of conducting the ballots only” (Raja, 2014, 18).

Though the tools and mechanism adopted for the formation of government in the country has a label of democracy but its spirit is feudal and all the time favored, hereditary politicians to come to power. Pakistan has so far remained unable to evolve a durable mechanism for free and fair electoral setup. This resulted in a fragile democratic setup in the country. Poorly executed electoral processes created a vacuum for the manipulative actors to capture the power, thus making the democratization only procedural not substantive one. “There exists a paradox of the rhetoric of democracy and the deliverance in the country.

Corrupt practices abound in Pakistan, and they extend to every aspect of government, judiciary, law enforcement, health care, and education. Even though there have been repeated calls for reform, and numerous attempts to improve the situation, little progress has been made. Pakistan still has high levels of corruption despite law enforcement, these civil servants, business people, and other office bearers engaging in corrupt activities, according to Ismail and Rashid (2014). While Pakistan has a legal framework aimed at curbing the vice, corruption is rampant, according to Transparency International (2017).

Furthermore, Transparency International points out that government employees and law enforcement officers have a tendency to engage in small-scale, hard to stop corruption. In addition to failing to achieve its objective, the TI has also moved away from it while making compromises in order to obtain political success. Pakistan remains a nation where religion plays a significant

role with a large Muslim population. Despite their desire for godly politicians, most people do not want religion to dictate all political decision making. Jamaat-e-Islami, for instance, can act as a pressure group by raising concerns when government policies contradict Islamic teachings in order to keep a check on government policy.

Jamaat-e-Islami(JI) is seen as more of a political party than a religious one. JI has never won a majority in elections despite being one of the most democratic parties. There are still voting rules based on sect, language, and cast in Pakistan. Various factors, both external and internal to the party, have contributed to the BJP's rise to political dominance. External factors include the decline and collapse of the once dominant Congress and regional parties, as well as the failure of non-Congress non-BJP parties to form stable governments.

While its ideological impact has been fairly broad, Jamaat has thus far had limited success in parliamentary elections. There are several reasons for this. Jamaat's distinctive organizational structure is frequently cited as a reason for its limited electoral victories. Some analysts noted that our organizational structure is more suitable for a revolutionary struggle, and not necessarily parliamentary elections.

This is despite the fact that Jamaat is considered the most internally democratic party in Pakistan, one that particularly obsessed with winning elections as much as they are keen on participating in them. For us, mass communication of our message conducts regular elections at each level of the organization. At times, one feels a lethargic contentedness among some of Jamaat's leaders and members, despite its poor electoral performance. They are not is an objective in its own right, and elections provide an occasion for this. This approach has been the subject of debate within Jamaat for quite some time now (Fuller,2003).

The electoral success of Islamically-oriented political parties in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia has underlined the need for bringing about basic changes in political strategy and organizational structure. Jamaat certainly wishes to broaden its social base to achieve greater electoral success as well as to have a more pragmatic structure that encourages influential personalities to run for leadership positions, rather than treating them as equal to ordinary members.

Jamaat experimented with the Pakistan Islamic Front and a youth organization named Pasban in the early 1990s, creating quite a stir in national politics, but elections came too early for them to properly prepare. These innovative structures created friction among the old guard and the new

recruits within the organization, and consequently, they were rolled back after the 1993 elections to maintain organizational unity (Usman, Ashar 2004)

This is an internal story of the BJP adapting to the times and of the popularity of Narendra Modi. A massive transformation has taken place within the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) over the last five years, and it is now the country's most formidable political force. Narendra Modi, who assumed power in May 2014, led the party to victory in the 2014 general election with a convincing majority. With its allies or on its own, it controls 20 states. Many factors have contributed to the rise of the party, such as its leadership, organizational skills, and effective groundwork.

In a democratic context, Jamaat's election failure is not an Islamist failure. The fact that it has been able to embed Islam into Pakistan's Objective Resolution and constitution also demonstrates its power, and Jamaat's continued status as the leading Islamist group in Pakistan after 76 years shows there is a place for political Islam in democracies. A clear opening to politics can only be achieved under a framework that allows for it, which Jamaat-e-Islami understands.

Conclusion

Since JI has been part of established political mainstream system, it has significantly gained political power both locally and nationally. Founded upon cultural and religious identity, Jamaa-e-Islami has developed rapidly as a political party. As a result, there was an active participation of JI in the political and electoral processes and struggle for implementation of Islamic law. Because JI was founded as a revolutionary, party that resisted conventional party structures and fought for power rather than a party that formed governments in the name of Islam, this study analyzes JI as NCIPM according to Maududi theory. In urging a change of the corrupt and secular system, JI appealed to the general public and educated circles in society. In Maududi's ideology, the emphasis was placed on Islamic cultural identity and new political structures aimed at enlarging the membership of the party.

In most cases, the NCIPM is strongest in the lower middle and middle classes. Nevertheless, other segments of society have also joined the NCIPM to bring about a change, disappointed by other mainstream parties. JI is based on three key features, namely, the middle class, the lower class, and individuals representing different segments of society and with different perspectives.

In spite of the fact that NCIPM is composed of middle- or lower-class members, specific groups from different social classes still support them. As a result of political policies of rent distribution, NCIPM has gained popularity as a political alternative in some countries due to the weakness of dominant secular political parties as anti-imperialism power, failing to take them into their hands by providing reasonable rent through import substitution. NCIPM will participate in the political system as an effective political power in case of rent reduction, which has a greater chance if the production of rent is not due to the sale of natural resources in the international market, but to indirect occupation of the economy.

NCIPM will strive to become owned by ruling state classes when a large amount of rent is collected through natural resources and indirect through economy. It was analyzed and measured variables to present and discuss JI as New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements (NCIPM) in accordance to the theoretical concept of Prof. Elsenhans. Sabastian also assisted in understanding the reasons behind the emergence and evolution of JI by applying the variables. Besides understanding the origins of JI, Sabastian also analyzed the variables of JI in order to explain its evolution. These variables illustrate how factors and elements influence the tendencies and formation of JI.

According to NCIPM, social classes are a source of power. By supporting liberal economic policies, NCIPM results in a reduction in rent that is in the interests of these classes. Lower middle class cannot join political structures due to rent reduction. In order to determine how rent is distributed, the state is involved. This is in conflict with the interests of the lower classes. Consequently, the lower class gains no benefit from being a part of this system.

With regard to the BJP in India, Sabastian's model of variables provides theoretical framework. Based on these variables, the JI as a religious-political party has been analyzed utilizing Elsenhan's Variables. The effectiveness of the variables has also been examined.

The preceding discussion leads us to the conclusion that, while some divinity may appear in Maududi's political theory, it is primarily driven by the interpreter's socio-political context and his subjective experiences that cannot be considered the divine. A significant issue within the framework of Islamic constitutionalism has been and will continue to be establishing an Islamic state. Mawududi has written extensively on the nature and responsibilities of the establishment of an Islamic state by Muslims. He has been one of the most vocal and articulate ideologues of the 20th century. It was Maududi who strongly believed that religion and politics had to be inseparable

and that God's sovereignty must be indivisible. Its ideology stressed the Islamic identity of the party's members and its new political set-up which boosted its membership. In order to achieve his comprehensive ideology, he wanted to form such a party.

"To me, it's important to diffuse Western thought from Muslim minds since Muslims have a culture and a civilization that are distinct from that of Western culture, and a system of education as well as economic life that are distinct from the Western systems."

He revives the idea of returning to the past because of the environment he lived in when talking about political traditions. He probably brought the concept of the perfect Khilafa out of his ties with the past. Rather than propose a system of public and parliamentary democracy, he proposes something entirely unpractical. His argument probably has merit because he does not restrict idiotism and idolatry to states, but rather accuses Muslim society and culture of performing these sins. Likewise, Maududi also focuses on the moral trainings of the societies; this is the reason why he lumps Islamic and pagan societies together since they share the same attitudes regardless of their religious affiliations. Another point worth mentioning is the anti-western dominance tradition. He uses the same political models and methods for reforming religious societies as has been successful in the West; A practice that has been followed by other Islamic thinkers as well. Maududi views seeing the West as a civilization and culture that must be critiqued as an age-long mission

After considering the above discussion, it can be concluded that Maududi opposed Muslim nationalism and the concept of two nations in the United India during the early days of movement for the independence of Pakistan because he believed it would be fatal to the unity of the Muslims.

Following the establishment of Pakistan, Jamat-e-Islami has articulated this ideologies into a new form that is not a nation state, but an Islamic state; a more flexible view of the rigid ideology. Now that pan-Islamism has become a cliché in Pakistani politics, the JI is unable to draw the huge support it once did. JI can no longer appeal to the massive support based on this slogan, as Pan-Islamism is already a cliché in prevailing politics in Pakistan. Because of the repeated failures in the general elections, Jamaat-e-Islami recognizes that its message is not relevant to the evolving dynamics of the electorate.

In addition to being an identity issue, nationalism is also a political movement. As the definition of nationalism varies, nationalism, one of the most dynamic practices of the 19th century, can be divided into many categories such as liberal, civic, ethnic or cultural. Nationalism is generally

considered a modern movement, even though civilization has always developed around shared identities.

The JI emerges as an important mainstream party in the present political climate and is based on cultural and Islamic identity; however, it struggles to gain support in the electorate. In order to overcome the major obstacles posed by ethnic politics and non-political actors, JI should develop a comprehensive strategy. Due to its location in Pakistan, a nation where Islam guides every facet of life and dominates all aspects of economic, social and political life, the Jamaat's failures stand out even more. Islam still leaves a clear imprint on the average illiterate, inarticulate, and uneducated Muslim, though he is not as enlightened as an educated, urban, and practicing Muslim.

Although the JI politicized Islam in Pakistan, it failed to benefit from it in any way. Since 1947, the number of religious voters has grown significantly, but not the share of JI voters. Despite it proving Islam's effectiveness as a political force, the JI had no means to prevent others from exploiting religion for their own ends.

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Notes

- 1- Mawdudi(25 September 1903 – 22 September 1979) was an Islamist philosopher, jurist, journalist and imam. His numerous works were written in Urdu, but then translated into

English and many other languages. He strove not only to revive Islam as a renewer of the religion. He believed that politics was essential for Islam and that it was necessary to institute sharia and preserve Islamic culture from what he saw as the evils of secularism, nationalism, socialism.

- 2- See more at: Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza (1996). *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*. Oxford University Press.
- 3- Jammāt-e-Islami official website
- 4- See the questionnaire in the end as appendix
- 5- Please refer to the questionnaire section in the end as appendix
- 6- Mawdudi (1996), *Islami Nizam-i-Zindagi awr us ke Bunyadi Tasawwrat [Islamic Way of Life and its Basic Concepts]*. Lahore: IPL:
- 7- See also Mawdudi (1996), Sayyid Abul A`la, *Islami Riyasat (Islamic State)*, Lahore: IPL, 18th ed. p. 1291-36.: Mawdudi (1990), *Islamic Law and Constitution*, translated and edited by Ahmad, Khurshid, IPL, 10th ed. pp. 253-262.
- 8- Also see Maulana Maududi and his thought, vol. 2, p.504-505.: Mawdudi, *Islami Riyasat*, p.582-595.
- 9- See Mawdudi (1990), *Al-Jihad fi al-Islam*. Lahore: Idarah Tarjuman-ul-Qur'an, p.21-52. Mawdudi (1996). *Sunnat ki 'Ayini Haythiyat [Constitutional status of Sunnah]*. IPL, 17th edition. See also *Khilafat wa Mulukiyyat [Caliphate and monarchy]* (1996), Lahore: Idarah-i-Tarjuman-ul-Qur'an, 24th edition. Mawdudi (1991), *Tafhim al-Qur'an [Meaning of the Qur'an]*, vol. 1, p. 6, Lahore: Tarjuman
- 10- *al-Qur'an*, 12th edition.

ⁱ See the questionnaire in the end as appendix

ⁱⁱ Please refer to the questionnaire section in the end as appendix

ⁱⁱⁱ The party's manifesto emphasizes personal transformation through obedience to Allah and living as a "true Muslim", rather than distinct political or economic goals. Lack of separation between the personal and the political is central to the party ethos. Its constitution states: "The mission of Jama'ate-Islami and the objective of all its efforts and struggle shall in practical terms be the establishment of the Deen (religion)". It adds: "Establishment of Deen does not mean establishing some part of it, rather establishing it in its entirety, in individual and collective life, and whether it pertains to prayers or fasting, Haj or zakat [Islamic tithe on income and wealth], socio-economic or political issues of life".

^{iv} Interview: Hafiz Sajid Anwar (JI), 2013

^v Mawdudi's ideal Islamic state had three "First Principles": that sovereignty belongs to God alone; that God is the sole legislator, and so all injunctions specified in the Qur'an may not be altered or undone, and all matters not specifically addressed in the Qur'an must be decided only by qualified scholars and jurors; and that an Islamic state

is only legitimate insofar as it strives to implement Divine Law, and so any action in opposition to Divine Law will therefore nullify its legitimacy.

^{vi} Husain Haqqani (1 July 1956) is a leading South Asia expert, journalist, academic, political activist and former ambassador of Pakistan to Sri Lanka and the United States. He is Pakistani. He has written two books on Pakistan: *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, and *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding*. His analysis has appeared in publications including *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Times*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Foreign Policy*. He has also been a speaker at the Aspen Ideas Festival. Haqqani is currently a Senior Fellow and Director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. and co-editor of Hudson's signature journal *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Haqqani worked as a journalist from 1980 to 1988, and then as political adviser for Nawaz Sharif and spokesperson for Benazir Bhutto.

Husain Haqqani is presently a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at Washington, D.C., and an associate professor of International Relations at Boston University. Haqqani is a former politician and journalist who received his initial grooming and orientation under the shadow of Maulana Maududi. After dissociating himself from Jama'at-e-Islami, he served as adviser to three former prime ministers of Pakistan, namely, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. He was also ambassador of Pakistan to Sri Lanka from 1992 to 1993. The experience of administration that he gathered in these latter capacities is fully reflected in his book and makes his narration of events all the more attractive and thrilling. Haqqani's book is a valuable source of information for the students of history, as well as for serious scholars.

^{vii} Sir Muhammad Iqbal (9 November 1877 – 21 April 1938), widely known as Allama Iqbal was a philosopher, poet, mystic and politician in British India who is widely regarded as having inspired the Pakistan Movement. He is considered one of the most important figures in Urdu literature, with literary work in both the Urdu and Persian languages. He gave the concept of a separate land for the Muslims of India.

^{viii} Ijtihad is an Islamic legal term that means "independent reasoning" or "the utmost effort an individual can put forth in an activity." [1] As one of the four sources of Sunni law, it is recognized as the decision-making process in Islamic law (sharia) through personal effort.

Itihād, (Arabic: "effort") in Islāmic law, the independent or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Qur'ān, Ḥadīth (traditions concerning the Prophet's life and utterances), and ijma' (scholarly consensus). In the early Muslim community every adequately qualified jurist had the right to exercise such original thinking, mainly ra'y (personal judgment) and qiyās (analogical reasoning), and those who did so were termed mujtahids. But with the crystallization of legal schools (madhabs) under the 'Abbāsids (reigned 750–1258), the Sunnites (the majority branch of Islām) held at the end of the 3rd century ah that the "gates of ijtihād" were closed and that no scholar could ever qualify again as mujtahid. All subsequent generations of jurists were considered bound to taqlīd, the unquestioned acceptance of their great predecessors as authoritative and could, at most, issue legal opinions drawn from established precedents.

^{ix} See the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency's (PILDAT) Annual Report on Internal Democracy of major Pakistani political parties for the years 2015 and 2016.

^x Interview

^{xi} See interviews Data from 2013 to 2016 as an attachment (Part 3).

^{xii} See interviews Data from 2013 to 2016 as an attachment (Part 3).

